ETSI TS 103 525-2 V1.2.1 (2022-01)

Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS);
Testing;
Conformance test specifications for ITS PKI management;
Part 2: Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes (TSS & TP)

Reference
RTS/ITS-005208

Keywords
ITS, security, testing, TSS&TP

ETSI

650 Route des Lucioles
F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE

Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16

Siret N° 348 623 562 00017 - APE 7112B
Association à but non lucratif enregistrée à la
Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° w061004871

Contents

Intellectual Property Rights

Essential patents

IPRs essential or potentially essential to normative deliverables may have been declared to ETSI. The declarations pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, are publicly available for **ETSI members and non-members**, and can be found in ETSI SR 000 314: *"Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in respect of ETSI standards"*, which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web server (https://ipr.etsi.org/).

Pursuant to the ETSI Directives including the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation regarding the essentiality of IPRs, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document.

Trademarks

The present document may include trademarks and/or tradenames which are asserted and/or registered by their owners. ETSI claims no ownership of these except for any which are indicated as being the property of ETSI, and conveys no right to use or reproduce any trademark and/or tradename. Mention of those trademarks in the present document does not constitute an endorsement by ETSI of products, services or organizations associated with those trademarks.

DECT™, **PLUGTESTS™**, **UMTS™** and the ETSI logo are trademarks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members. **3GPP™** and **LTE™** are trademarks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners. **oneM2M™** logo is a trademark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the oneM2M Partners. **GSM**® and the GSM logo are trademarks registered and owned by the GSM Association.

Foreword

This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS).

The present document is part 2 of a multi-part deliverable. Full details of the entire series can be found in part 1 [4].

Modal verbs terminology

In the present document "**shall**", "**shall not**", "**should**", "**should not**", "**may**", "**need not**", "**will**", "**will not**", "**can**" and "**cannot**" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions).

"**must**" and "**must not**" are **NOT** allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.

1 Scope

The present document provides the Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes (TSS & TP) for PKI management as defined in ETSI TS 102 941 [1] in accordance with the relevant guidance given in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [i.6].

The ISO standard for the methodology of conformance testing (ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.3] and ISO/IEC 9646-2 [i.4]) as well as the ETSI rules for conformance testing (ETSI ETS 300 406 [i.7]) are used as a basis for the test methodology.

2 References

2.1 Normative references

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/.

NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.

The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.

[1] ETSI TS 102 941 (V1.4.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Trust and Privacy Management".

[2] ETSI TS 103 097 (V1.4.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Security header and certificate formats".

[3] IEEE Std 1609.2™-2016: "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments - Security Services for Applications and Management Messages", as amended by IEEE Std 1609.2a™-2017: "Standard for Wireless Access In Vehicular Environments - Security Services for Applications and Management Messages Amendment 1".

[4] ETSI TS 103 525-1 (V1.2.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Conformance test specifications for ITS PKI management; Part 1: Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS)".

[5] ETSI TS 103 096-2 (V1.5.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Conformance test specifications for ITS Security; Part 2: Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes (TSS & TP)".

[6] ETSI TS 103 601 (V1.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Security management messages communication requirements and distribution protocols".

2.2 Informative references

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.

The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

[i.1] ETSI EG 202 798 (V1.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Framework for conformance and interoperability testing".

[i.2] ETSI TS 102 965 (V1.3.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Application Object Identifier (ITS-AID); Registration".

[i.3] ISO/IEC 9646-1 (1994): "Information technology -- Open Systems Interconnection -- Conformance testing methodology and framework -- Part 1: General concepts".

[i.4] ISO/IEC 9646-2 (1994): "Information technology -- Open Systems Interconnection -- Conformance testing methodology and framework -- Part 2: Abstract Test Suite specification".

[i.5] ISO/IEC 9646-6 (1994): "Information technology -- Open Systems Interconnection -- Conformance testing methodology and framework -- Part 6: Protocol profile test specification".

[i.6] ISO/IEC 9646-7 (1995): "Information technology -- Open Systems Interconnection -- Conformance testing methodology and framework -- Part 7: Implementation Conformance Statements".

[i.7] ETSI ETS 300 406 (1995): "Methods for testing and Specification (MTS); Protocol and profile conformance testing specifications; Standardization methodology".

[i.8] United Nations Statistics Division: "Standard country or area codes for statistical use (M49)".

3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations

3.1 Terms

For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 102 941 [1], ETSI TS 103 097 [2], ETSI TS 103 525-1 [4], ETSI TS 102 965 [i.2], ISO/IEC 9646-6 [i.5], ISO/IEC 9646-7 [i.6] and the following apply:

AID_CERT_REQ: "Secured certificate request service" ITS-AID

AID_CTL: "CTL service" ITS-AID

AID_CRL: "CRL service" ITS-AID

3.2 Symbols

Void.

3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

AA	Authorization Authority
AID	Application IDentifier
AID_CAM	ITS Application IDentifier for CAM
AID_DENM	Application Identifier for DENM
AID_GN	Application Identifier for general GeoNetworking messages
AT	Authorization Ticket
ATS	Abstract Test Suite
BO	exceptional BehaviOur
BV	Valid Behaviour
CA	Certification Authority
CAM	Co-operative Awareness Messages
CERT	CERTificate
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CTL	Certificate Trust List
DENM	Decentralized Environmental Notification Message
EA	Enrolment Authority
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography

ECTL	European Certificate Trust List
GN	GeoNetworking
ITS	Intelligent Transportation Systems
ITS-S	Intelligent Transport System - Station
IUT	Implementation Under Test
MSG	MesSaGe
PICS	Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement
SSP	Service Specific Permissions
TP	Test Purposes
TS	Test System
TSS	Test Suite Structure

4 Test Suite Structure (TSS)

4.1 Structure for Security tests

Table 1 shows the Security Test Suite Structure (TSS) defined for conformance testing.

Table 1: TSS for Security Management

Root	Group	Sub-Group	Category
Security Management	ITS-S	Enrolment	Valid
		Authorization	Valid
		CRL handling	Valid
		CTL handling	Valid
	CA	Common Certificate Authority	Valid
	EA	Enrolment	Valid
		Authorization Validation	Valid
		CA certificate generation	Valid
		CRL handling	Valid
		CTL handling	Valid
	AA	Authorization	Valid
		Authorization Validation	Valid
		CA certificate generation	Valid
		CRL handling	Valid
		CTL handling	Valid
	RootCA	CA certificate generation	Valid
		CTL/CRL generation	Valid
	DC	CTL/CRL distribution	Valid
	TLM	ECTL generation	Valid
		TLM certificate generation	Valid
	CPOC	ECTL distribution	Valid

4.2 Test entities and states

4.2.1 ITS-S states

- State 'initialized':
  - ITS-S in 'initialized' state is ready to perform the enrolment request.
  - ITS-S in 'initialized' state contains following information elements:
    - permanent canonical identifier (PCI);
    - public/private key pair for cryptographic purposes (canonical key pair);
    - the trust anchor (Root CA) public key certificate and the DC network address;

        - contact information for the EA which will issue certificates for the ITS-S:
            - network address;
            - public key certificate.

- State 'enrolled':
    - ITS-S in 'enrolled' state has successfully performed the enrolment request process.
    - ITS-S in 'enrolled' state is ready to perform an authorization request.
    - ITS-S in 'enrolled' state contains all information elements of the 'initialized' state and additionally:
        - enrolment credential (EC) - with the condition of being neither expired nor revoked;
        - private key corresponding to the EC public encryption key;
        - private key corresponding to the EC public verification key.
- State 'authorized':
    - ITS-S in 'authorized' state has successfully performed the authorization request process.
    - ITS-S in 'authorized' state contains all information elements of the 'enrolled' state and additionally:
        - one or more authorization tickets (AT):
            - being not expired;
            - of which at least one is currently valid;
        - all private keys corresponding to the AT public verification keys;
        - if applicable: all private keys corresponding to the AT public encryption keys.

4.2.2 EA states

- State 'initial':
    - EA contains following information elements:
        - the trust anchor (Root CA) public key certificate and the DC network address.
- State 'operational':
    - EA is ready to receive enrolment requests from ITS-S.
    - In addition to information elements enumerated in the 'initial' state, EA in the 'operational' state contains following information elements:
        - public/private key pairs and EA certificate permitting issuing of enrolment certificates.

4.2.3 AA states

- State 'initial':
    - AA in initial state contains following information elements:
        - the trust anchor (Root CA) public key certificate and the DC network address;
- State 'operational':
    - public/private key pairs and AA certificate permitting issuing of authorization tickets (AT certificates);
    - root CTL containing trusted EA certificates;

- the EA access point URL.

4.2.4 RootCA states

- State 'operational':
  - RootCA is offline, but can generate CRL, CTL, AA, EA, RCA, etc. certificates by manual request.

4.2.5 TLM states

- State 'operational':
  - TLM is offline, but can generate ECTL by manual request.

4.3 Test configurations

4.3.1 Overview

4.3.2 Enrolment

4.3.2.1 Configuration CFG_ENR_ITSS

IUT: ITS-S in the state 'initialized':

- Following information elements shall be provided by IUT for the EA emulated by the TS:
  - Permanent Canonical Identifier (PCI);
  - public key of canonical key pair;
  - profile information.

TS: EA is emulated by TS.

4.3.2.2 Configuration CFG_ENR_EA

IUT: EA is in the state 'operational', ready to handle enrolment requests and contains following information about ITS-S emulated by the TS:

- the permanent canonical identifier of the emulated ITS-S;
- the profile information for the emulated ITS-S;
- the public key from the canonical key pair belonging to the emulated ITS-S.

TS: ITS-S is emulated by the TS.

4.3.3 Authorization

4.3.3.1 Configuration CFG_AUTH_ITSS

IUT: ITS-S in the state 'enrolled' and containing following information:

- the AA certificate of the emulated AA;
- the EA certificate of the emulated EA;
- the EC certificate issued by the emulated EA.

The URL of the emulated AATS: AA is emulated by the TS.

4.3.3.2 Configuration CFG_AUTH_AA

IUT: AA in the operational state and containing following information:

- The profile information for the emulated ITS-S.

TS: ITS-S is emulated by the TS:

- EA is emulated by the TS and validates all incoming requests.

4.3.4 Authorization Validation

4.3.4.1 Configuration CFG_AVALID_AA

IUT: AA in the operational state and containing following information:

- the certificate of the emulated EA;
- the URL of the emulated EA.

TS: EA is emulated by the TS and ready to receive authorization validation requests:

- ITS-S is emulated by TS to trigger the authorization process.

4.3.4.2 Configuration CFG_AVALID_EA

IUT: EA is in the operational state, ready to handle authorization validation requests and contains following information about AA and ITS-S emulated by the TS:

- the permanent canonical identifier of the emulated ITS-S;
- the profile information for the emulated ITS-S;
- the public key from the key pair belonging to the emulated ITS-S.

TS: AA and ITS-S are emulated by the TS and contain following information elements:

- EC certificate issued by IUT;
- EA certificate of IUT;
- the URL of the EA.

4.3.5 CA certificate generation

4.3.5.1 Configuration CFG_CAGEN_INIT

IUT: CA (EA or AA) in the initial state.

TS: TS checks generated certificate requests and does not emulate any ITS entity.

4.3.5.2 Configuration CFG_CAGEN_REKEY

IUT: CA (EA or AA) in the operational state.

TS: TS checks generated certificate requests and does not emulate any ITS entity.

4.3.5.3 Configuration CFG_CAGEN_RCA

IUT: Offline RootCA in operational state, generating EA, AA or RCA certificate.

TS: TS checks generated certificate and does not emulate any ITS entity.

4.3.6 ECTL generation

4.3.6.1 Configuration CFG_CTLGEN_TLM

IUT: TLM in the operational state.

TS: TS checks generated CTL and does not emulate any ITS entity.

4.3.6.2 Configuration CFG_CTLGEN_CPOC

IUT: CPOC in the operational state.

TS: TS checks generated CTL emulating http client of CPOC.

4.3.7 Root CTL generation

4.3.7.1 Configuration CFG_CTLGEN_RCA

IUT: RCA in the operational state.

TS: TS checks generated CTL and does not emulate any ITS entity.

4.3.8 CRL generation

4.3.8.1 Configuration CFG_CRLGEN_RCA

IUT: RCA in the operational state.

TS: TS checks generated CRL and does not emulate any ITS entity.

4.3.9 ITS-S CRL/CTL handling

4.3.9.1 Configuration CFG_CXL_P2P

IUT: ITS-S in the state 'authorized' and containing following information:

- the RCA certificate of the emulated RCA;
- the AT certificate issued by the emulated AA;
- the AA certificate of the emulated AA;
- the EA certificate of the emulated EA;
- the EC certificate issued by the emulated EA;
- the URL of the emulated DC.

Neighbour ITS-S: is emulated by the TS.

RCA: is emulated by the TS.

DC: is emulated by the TS.

5 Test Purposes (TP)

5.1 Introduction

5.1.1 TP definition conventions

The TP definition is built according to ETSI EG 202 798 [i.1].

5.1.2 TP Identifier naming conventions

The identifier of the TP is built according to Table 2.

Table 2: TP naming convention

Identifier	TP_<root>_<tgt>_<gr>_<sn>_<x>		
	<root> = root	SECPKI	
	<tgt> = target	ITSS	ITS-Station
		CA	Common Certificate Authority
		AA	Authorization Authority
		EA	Enrolment Authority
		RCA	Root Certification Authority
		DC	Distribution Center
		CPOC	C-ITS Point of Contact
	<gr> = group	ENR	Enrolment
		AUTH	Authorization
		AUTHVAL	Authorization Validation
		CRL	CRL handling
		CTL	CTL handling
		CERTGEN	Certificate generation
		CTLGEN	CTL generation
		ECTLGEN	ECTL generation
		CRLGEN	CRL generation
		LISTDIST	CTL/CRL/ECTL distribution
		TLMCERTGEN	TLM certificate generation
	<sgr>=sub-group	SND	Sending behaviour
		RCV	Receiving behaviour
		REP	Repetition behaviour
	<sn> = test purpose sequential number		01 to 99
	<x> = category	BV	Valid Behaviour tests
		BI	Invalid Behaviour Tests

5.1.3 Rules for the behaviour description

The description of the TP is built according to ETSI EG 202 798 [i.1].

ETSI TS 102 941 [1] does not use the finite state machine concept. As consequence, the test purposes use a generic "Initial State" that corresponds to a state where the IUT is ready for starting the test execution. Furthermore, the IUT shall be left in this "Initial State", when the test is completed.

Being in the "Initial State" refers to the starting point of the initial device configuration. There are no pending actions, no instantiated buffers or variables, which could disturb the execution of a test.

5.1.4 Sources of TP definitions

All TPs have been specified according to ETSI TS 102 941 [1] which shall be followed as specified in the clauses below.

5.1.5 Mnemonics for PICS reference

To avoid an update of all TPs when the PICS document is changed, Table 3 introduces mnemonics name and the correspondence with the real PICS item number. The 'PICS item' as defined in tables provided in clause A.6 of ETSI TS 103 525-1 [4] and in IEEE 1609.2 [3] shall be used to determine the test applicability.

Table 3: Mnemonics for PICS reference

Mnemonic	PICS item
PICS_SECPKI_IUT_ITSS	[4] A.3.1
PICS_SECPKI_IUT_EA	[4] A.4.2
PICS_SECPKI_IUT_AA	[4] A.4.3
PICS_SECPKI_IUT_RCA	[4] A.4.4
PICS_SECPKI_IUT_DC	[4] A.4.5
PICS_SECPKI_IUT_TLM	[4] A.4.6
PICS_SECPKI_IUT_CPOC	[4] A.4.7
PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT	[4] A.3.2 or A.5.1
PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT_RETRY	[4] A.3.2.2 or A.5.4
PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT	[4] A.3.2.1 or A.5.2
PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION	[4] A.3.3 or A.6.1
PICS_SECPKI_ AUTHORIZATION _RETRY	[4] A.3.3.3 or A.6.5
PICS_SECPKI_AUTH_PRIVACY	[4] A.3.3.1 or A.6.3
PICS_SECPKI_AUTH_POP	[4] A.3.3.2 or A.6.2
PICS_SECPKI_AUTH_VALIDATION	[4] A.5.3
PICS_SECPKI_CRL	[4] A.9.5 or A.7.1
PICS_SECPKI_CRL_DOWNLOAD	[4] A.9.6
PICS_SECPKI_CRL_BROADCAST	[4] A.9.9
PICS_SECPKI_CTL	[4] A.9.3 or A.7.2
PICS_SECPKI_CTL_DELTA	[4] A.9.3.1 or A.7.2.1 or A.7.4.1
PICS_SECPKI_CTL_DOWNLOAD	[4] A.9.4
PICS_SECPKI_CTL_BROADCAST	[4] A.9.8
PICS_SECPKI_ECTL	[4] A.9.1 or A.8.1
PICS_SECPKI_ECTL_DELTA	[4] A.9.1.1 or A.8.1.1 or A.8.2.1
PICS_SECPKI_ECTL_DOWNLOAD	[4] A.9.2 or A.8.3
PICS_SECPKI_ECTL_BROADCAST	[4] A.9.7
PICS_SEC_SHA256	[3] S1.2.2.1.1 or S1.3.2.1.1
PICS_SEC_SHA384	[3] S1.2.2.1.2 or S1.3.2.1.2
PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P256R1	[3] S1.2.2.4.1.2 or S1.3.2.4.1.2
PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P384R1	[3] S1.2.2.4.2 or S1.3.2.4.2
PICS_SEC_IMPLICIT_CERTIFICATES	[3] S1.2.2.8, S1.3.2.7 and S1.3.2.9
PICS_SEC_EXPLICIT_CERTIFICATES	[3] S1.2.2.7, S1.3.2.6 and S1.3.2.8

5.1.6 Certificates content

The certificates, defined in ETSI TS 103 096-2 [5], clause 6.1.1 is applicable for the present document. Additional certificates used in the test purposes are defined in the Table 4.

Table 4: Certificates content

AA certificate	Content	To be installed on the IUT
CERT_IUT_A_AA	• signer digest of the CERT_IUT_A_CA • application permissions: – CRT_REQ with SSP 0x0132; • certificate issuing permissions (SSP value/mask): – CAM with all possible SPP (0x01FFFC / 0xFF0003); – DENM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFFFF / 0xFF000000); – SPATEM with all possible SSP (0x01E0 / 0xFF1F); – MAPEM with all possible SSP (0x01C0 / 0xFF3F); – IVIM with all possible SSP (0x01000000FFF8 / 0xFF0000000007); – SREM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFFE0 / 0xFF00001F); – SSEM with all possible SSP (0x01 / 0xFF); – GPC with all possible SSP (0x01 / 0xFF); – GN-MGMT without SSP; • validation time for 3 years; • no region restriction; • assurance level 4; • verification key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve; • encryption key of type compressed with NIST P256R curve; • valid signature of type x-only with NIST P256R curve;	Yes
CERT_IUT_A_CA	• same as CERT_IUT_A_AA;	Yes
CERT_IUT_I_CA	• same as CERT_IUT_A_CA; • type implicit; • not containing signature; • not containing verification key; • containing reconstruction value.	Yes

5.2 ITS-S behaviour

5.2.0 Overview

All test purposes in the present clause may be included in the test sequence if following PICS items are set:

PICS_SECPKI_IUT_ITSS = TRUE

5.2.1 Manufacturing

The manufacturing procedure defined in ETSI TS 102 941 [1] is out of scope of the present document.

5.2.2 Enrolment

5.2.2.0 Overview

All test purposes in clause 5.2.2 may be included in the test sequence if following PICS items are set:

PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT = TRUE

5.2.2.1 Enrolment request

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV
Summary	Check that IUT sends an enrolment request when triggered
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.1.3
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initialized' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to requested a new Enrolment Certificate (EC) then the IUT sends to EA an EnrolmentRequestMessage	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_02_BV
Summary	If the enrolment request of the IUT is an initial enrolment request, the itsId (contained in the InnerECRequest) shall be set to the canonical identifier, the signer (contained in the outer EtsiTs1030971Data-Signed) shall be set to self and the outer signature shall be computed using the canonical private key
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.1.3 and 6.2.3.2.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initialized' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing EtsiTs103097Data containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP containing InnerEcRequest containing itsId indicating the canonical identifier of the ITS-S and containing signer declared as self and containing signature computed using the canonical private key	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_03_BV
Summary	In presence of a valid EC, the enrolment request of the IUT is a rekeying enrolment request with the itsId (contained in the InnerECRequest) and the SignerIdentifier (contained in the outer EtsiTs1030971Data-Signed) both declared as digest containing the HashedId8 of the EC and the outer signature computed using the current valid EC private key corresponding to the verification public key
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.1.3 and 6.2.3.2.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'enrolled' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing EtsiTs103097Data containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP containing InnerEcRequest containing itsId declared as digest containing the HashedId8 of the EC identifier and containing signer declared as digest containing the HashedId8 of the EC identifier and containing signature computed using the current valid EC private key corresponding to the verification public key	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_04_BV
Summary	If the EC is revoked, the IUT returns to the state 'initialized'
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.1.3 and 6.2.3.2.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	PICS_SECPKI_CRL
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'enrolled' state ensure that when the IUT is informed about a revocation of its EC then the IUT returns to the 'initialized' state	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_05_BV
Summary	If the EC expires, the IUT returns to the state 'initialized'
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.1.3 and 6.2.3.2.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'enrolled' state ensure that when the EC of the IUT expires then the IUT returns to the 'initialized' state	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV
Summary	For each enrolment request, the ITS-S shall generate a new verification key pair corresponding to an approved signature algorithm as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2]
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.1 ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 7
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initialized' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send multiple EnrolmentRequestMessage then each EnrolmentRequestMessage contains a different and unique verification key pair within the InnerECRequest.	
NOTE: The first EnrolmentRequestMessage should be an initial request, the following EnrolmentRequestMessages should be rekeying requests.	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_07_BV
Summary	Within the InnerECRequest, the requestedSubjectAttributes shall not contain a certIssuePermissions field
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the **X_STATE** ensure that when the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing EtsiTs103097Data containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP containing InnerEcRequest containing requestedSubjectAttributes not containing certIssuePermissions	

Variants	
nn	**X_STATE**
1	'initialized' state
2	'enrolled' state

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_08_BV
Summary	In the headerInfo of the tbsData of the InnerECRequestSignedForPOP all other components of the component tbsdata.headerInfo except generationTime and psid are not used and absent. The psid shall be set to "secured certificate request" as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 [i.2] and the generationTime shall be present
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	

Expected behaviour

with
the IUT being in the **X_STATE**
ensure that
when
the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
then
the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
containing EtsiTs103097Data
containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP
containing tbsData
containing headerInfo
containing psid
indicating AID_CERT_REQ
and containing generationTime
and not containing any other component of tbsdata.headerInfo

Variants

nn	**X_STATE**
1	'initialized' state
2	'enrolled' state

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV
Summary	In the headerInfo of the tbsData of the outer EtsiTs102941Data-Signed all other components of the component tbsdata.headerInfo except generationTime and psid are not used and absent. The psid shall be set to "secured certificate request" as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 [i.2] and the generationTime shall be present
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	

Expected behaviour

with
the IUT being in the **X_STATE**
ensure that
when
the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
then
the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
containing tbsData
containing headerInfo
containing psid
indicating AID_CERT_REQ
and containing generationTime
and not containing any other component of tbsdata.headerInfo

Variants

nn	**X_STATE**
1	'initialized' state
2	'enrolled' state

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_10_BV
Summary	The EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted containing the correctly encrypted ciphertext and a recipients component containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice certRecipInfo containing the hashedId8 of the EA certificate in recipientId and the encrypted data encryption key in encKey. The data encryption key is encrypted using the public key found in the EA certificate referenced in the recipientId
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	

Expected behaviour

```
with
    the IUT being in the X_STATE
ensure that
    when
        the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
    then
        the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
            containing recipients
                containing exactly one instance of RecipientInfo of choice certRecipInfo
                    containing recipientId
                      indicating the hashedId8
                          referencing to the EA certificate
                              containing encryptionKey (KEY)
                    and containing encKey
                      being a symmetric key (SYMKEY) encrypted using the key KEY
            containing ciphertext
                which is encrypted using the symmetric key SYMKEY contained in encKey
```

Variants

nn	X_STATE
1	'initialized' state
2	'enrolled' state

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_11_BV
Summary	In the inner signed data structure (InnerECRequestSignedForPOP), the signature is computed on InnerECRequest with the private key corresponding to the new verificationKey to prove possession of the generated verification key pair
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	

Expected behaviour

```
with
    the IUT being in the X_STATE
ensure that
    when
        the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
    then
        the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
            containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
                containing EtsiTs103097Data
                    containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP
                        containing tbsData
                            containing InnerEcRequest
                                containing verificationKey (VKEY)
                        containing signature
                            computed on InnerECRequest
                                using the private key corresponding to VKEY
                                    contained in InnerECRequest
```

Variants

nn	X_STATE
1	'initialized' state
2	'enrolled' state

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_12_BV
Summary	Check that signing of Enrolment Request message is permitted by the EC certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.1.3 and 6.2.3.2.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'enrolled' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing signer containing digest indicating HashedId8 of the EC certificate containing appPermissions containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ and containing ssp containing opaque[0] (version) indicating 1 containing opaque[1] (value) indicating 'Enrolment Request' (bit 1) set to 1	

5.2.2.2 Enrolment response handling

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RCV_01_BV
Summary	If an enrolment request fails, the IUT returns to the state 'initialized
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.1.3 and 6.2.3.2.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the **X_STATE** and the IUT has sent the EnrolmentRequestMessage ensure that when the IUT received the EnrolmentResponseMessage containing a responseCode different than 0 then the IUT returns to the **X_STATE** state	
Variants	

nn	X_STATE
1	'initialized' state
2	'enrolled' state

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RCV_02_BV
Summary	The IUT is capable of parsing and handling of positive EnrolmentResponse messages containing the requested EC. In case of a successful enrolment, the IUT switches to the state 'enrolled'
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.1.3, 6.2.3.2.1 and 6.2.3.2.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initialized' state and the IUT has sent the EnrolmentRequestMessage ensure that when the IUT receives a subsequent EnrolmentResponseMessage as an answer of the EA containing a responseCode indicating 0 and containing an enrolment certificate then the IUT switches to the 'enrolled' state	

5.2.2.3 Enrolment request repetition

All test purposes in clause 5.2.2.3 may be included in the test sequence if following PICS items are set:

- PICS_SECPKI_ ENROLMENT _RETRY = TRUE

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_REP_01_BV
Summary	Check that IUT repeats an enrolment request when response has not been received
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initialized' state and the IUT already sent the Enrolment Request at the time T1 and the IUT has not yet received the Enrolment Response ensure that when the IUT local time is reached the T1 + PIXIT_ENR_TIMEOUT_TH1 then the IUT sends to EA an EnrolmentRequestMessage	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_REP_02_BV
Summary	Check that IUT uses the same message to perform enrolment retry
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initialized' state and the IUT already sent the Enrolment Request (***M***) ensure that when the IUT is triggered to re-send an Enrolment Request then the IUT sends ***M*** to EA	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_REP_03_BV
Summary	Check that IUT stops sending the Enrolment Request message if Enrolment Response message has been received
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initialized' state and the IUT has sent the Enrolment Request more than 1 time ensure that when the IUT receives an Enrolment Response then the IUT stops sending Enrolment Requests to EA	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_REP_04_BV
Summary	Check that IUT stops sending the Enrolment Request message if maximum number of retry has been reached
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initialized' state and the IUT has started sending the Enrolment Request ensure that when the IUT sent the PIXIT_ENR_MAX_N1 Enrolment Request messages then the IUT stops sending Enrolment Requests	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_REP_05_BV
Summary	Check that IUT stops sending the Enrolment Request message if timeout has been reached
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initialized' state and the IUT has started sending the Enrolment Request at the time T1 ensure that when the IUT local time is reached the T1 + PIXIT_ENR_TIMEOUT_TH2 then the IUT stops sending an Enrolment Request messages	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_REP_05_BV
Summary	Check that IUT stops sending the Enrolment Request message if sending timeout (TH2) has been reached
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initialized' state and the IUT has started sending the Enrolment Request ensure that when the IUT sent the Enrolment Request messages then the IUT stops sending Enrolment Requests	

5.2.3 Authorization

5.2.3.0 Overview

All test purposes in clause 5.2.3 may be included in the test sequence if following PICS items are set:

PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION = TRUE

5.2.3.1 Authorization request

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV
Summary	Check that the ITS-S send the Authorization Request message to the Authorization Authority (AA) to request an authorization ticket
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.0
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT in 'enrolled' state and the AA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data to the AA	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_02_BV
Summary	Check that the AuthorizationRequest message is encrypted and sent to only one Authorization Authority
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT in 'enrolled' state and the AA in 'operational' state authorized with CERT_IUT_A_AA certificate ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA containing content.encryptedData.recipients indicating size 1 and containing the instance of RecipientInfo containing certRecipInfo containing recipientId indicating HashedId8 of the CERT_IUT_A_AA	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_03_BV
Summary	Check that the AuthorizationRequest message is encrypted using the `encryptionKey` found in the AA certificate referenced in `recipientId`
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT in 'enrolled' state and the AA in 'operational' state authorized with AA certificate containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY) ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA containing content.encryptedData containing ciphertext containing data encrypted using AA_ENC_PUB_KEY	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV
Summary	Check that the AuthorizationRequest message is never reused the same encryption key and nonce
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT in 'authorized' state and the IUT already sent one or more Authorization Requests and the AA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA containing content.encryptedData containing ciphertext.aes128ccm.nonce indicating value not equal to the nonce in N previous messages and containing recipients[0].certRecipInfo.encKey containing encrypted symmetric key (S_KEY) indicating symmetric key not equal to the key was used in N previous messages	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_05_BV
Summary	Check that the Authorization request protocol version is set to 1
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT in 'enrolled' state and the AA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA containing EtsiTs102941Data containing version containing indicating 1 containing content containing authorizationRequest	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_06_BV
Summary	Check that for each Authorization request the ITS-S generates a new verification key pair Check that for each Authorization request the ITS-S generates a new encryption key pair Check that for each Authorization request the ITS-S generates a new hmac-key
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	

Expected behaviour

with
the IUT in 'enrolled' state
and the AA in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT)
then
the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
containing EtsiTs102941Data
containing authorizationRequest
containing publicKeys
containing verificationKey
indicating value not equal to the field verificationKey of N previous messages
and not containing encryptionKey
or containing encryptionKey
indicating value not equal to the field encryptionKey of N previous messages
and containing hmacKey
indicating value not equal to the field hmacKey of N previous messages

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_07_BV
Summary	Check that ITS-S sends Authorization request with properly calculated keyTag field
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	

Expected behaviour

with
the IUT in 'enrolled' state
and the AA in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT)
then
the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
containing EtsiTs102941Data
containing authorizationRequest
containing sharedAtRequest
containing keyTag
indicating properly calculated value

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_08_BV
Summary	Check that ITS-S sends Authorization request with eaId of EA certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is enrolled by the EC, signed with the CERT EA certificate and the AA in 'operational' stateensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA containing EtsiTs102941Data containing authorizationRequest containing sharedAtRequest containing eaId indicating HashedId8 of CERT_ EA certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_09_BV
Summary	Check that ITS-S sends Authorization request with the certificateFormat equal to 1
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT in 'enrolled' state and the AA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA containing EtsiTs102941Data containing authorizationRequest containing sharedAtRequest containing certificateFormat indicating 1	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_10_BV
Summary	Check that ITS-S sends Authorization request certificate attributes are properly set
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT in 'enrolled' state and the AA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA containing EtsiTs102941Data containing authorizationRequest containing sharedAtRequest containing requestedSubjectAttributes containing appPermissions and not containing certIssuePermissions	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_11_BV
Summary	Check that ITS-S sends Authorization request containing EC signature Check that the EC signature of the Authorization request contains valid hash algorithm Check that the ecSignature DataHash is calculated over the sharedATRequest
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
the IUT in 'enrolled' state
and the AA in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT)
then
the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
containing EtsiTs102941Data
containing authorizationRequest
containing ecSignature
containing structure of type EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload
containing hashId
indicating supported hash algorithm (HASH_ALG)
and containing tbsData
containing payload
containing extDataHash
indicating hash of sharedATRequest using HASH_ALG

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_12_BV
Summary	Check that the ecSignature psid is set to the proper ITS_AID Check that the ecSignature generation time is present
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
the IUT in 'enrolled' state
and the AA in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT)
then
the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
containing EtsiTs102941Data
containing authorizationRequest
containing ecSignature
containing structure of type EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload
containing tbsData
containing headerInfo
containing psid
indicating AID_PKI_CERT_REQUEST
and containing generationTime
and not containing any other headers

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_13_BV
Summary	Check that ITS-S sends Authorization request containing EC signature
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT in 'enrolled' state and the AA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA containing EtsiTs102941Data containing authorizationRequest containing ecSignature containing structure of type EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload containing hashId indicating supported hash algoritm	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_14_BV
Summary	Check that the ecSignature of the Authorization request is signed with EC certificate Check that the signature over tbsData computed using the private key corresponding to the EC's verification public key
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is enrolled with CERT_EC certificate and the AA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA containing EtsiTs102941Data containing authorizationRequest containing ecSignature containing structure of type EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload containing signer indicating HashedId8 of the CERT_EC certificate containing signature indicating signature over sharedATRequest calculated with CERT_EC verificationKey	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_15_BV
Summary	Check that the encrypted ecSignature of the Authorization request is encrypted using the EA encryptionKey Check that the encrypted ecSignature of the Authorization request was done from the EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload structure
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_PRIVACY=TRUE
Expected behaviour	

with
the IUT in 'enrolled' state
and the AA in 'operational' state
and the EA in 'operational' state
authorized with CERT_EA certificate
ensure that
when
the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT)
then
the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
containing EtsiTs102941Data
containing authorizationRequest
containing ecSignature
containing encryptedEcSignature
containing recipients
containing only one element of type RecipientInfo
containing certRecipInfo
containing recipientId
indicating HashedId8 of the CERT_EA
and containing encKey
indicating encryption key of supported type
and containing cypertext
containing encrypted representation
of structure EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_16_BV
Summary	Check that the ecSignature of the Authorization request is not encrypted
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_PRIVACY=FALSE
Expected behaviour	

with
the IUT in 'enrolled' state
and the AA in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT)
then
the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
containing EtsiTs102941Data
containing authorizationRequest
containing ecSignature
containing ecSignature

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_17_BV
Summary	Check that the Authorization request is not signed when Prove of Possession is not used
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=FALSE
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT in 'enrolled' state and the AA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted to the AA containing encrypted representation of the Ieee1609Dot2Data containing content.unsecuredData	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_18_BV
Summary	Check that the Authorization request is signed when Prove of Possession is used Check that proper headers is used in Authorization request with POP Check that the Authorization request with POP is self-signed
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT in 'enrolled' state and the AA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted to the AA containing cyphertext containing encrypted representation of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing content.signedData containing hashId indicating valid hash algorithm and containing tbsData containing headerInfo containing psid indicating AID_PKI_CERT_REQUEST and containing generationTime and not containing any other headers and containing signer containing self and containing signature indicating value calculated over tbsData with the private key correspondent to the verificationKey from this message	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_19_BV
Summary	Check that the signing of ecSignature of the Authorization request is permitted by the EC certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT in 'enrolled' state and the AA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA containing EtsiTs102941Data containing authorizationRequest containing ecSignature containing structure of type EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload containing signer indicating HashedId8 of EC certificate containing appPermissions containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ and containing ssp containing opaque[0] (version) indicating 1 containing opaque[1] (value) indicating 'Enrolment Request' (bit 1) set to 1	

5.2.3.2 Authorization response handling

Void.

5.2.3.3 Authorization request repetition

All test purposes in clause 5.2.3.3 may be included in the test sequence if following PICS items are set:

PICS_SECPKI_ AUTHORIZATION _RETRY = TRUE

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_REP_01_BV
Summary	Check that IUT repeats an authorization request when response has not been received
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.2
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'enrolled' state and the IUT already sent the Authorization Request at the time ***T1*** and the IUT has not yet received the Authorization Response ensure that when the IUT local time is reached the ***T1*** + PIXIT_AUTH_TIMEOUT_TH1 then the IUT sends to EA an AuthorizationRequestMessage	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_REP_02_BV
Summary	Check that IUT uses the same message to perform authorization retry
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'enrolled' state and the IUT already sent the Authorization Request (***M***) to AA ensure that when the IUT is triggered to re-send an AuthorizationRequestMessage to AA then the IUT sends ***M*** to AA	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_REP_03_BV
Summary	Check that IUT stops sending the Authorization Request message if Authorization Response message has been received
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'enrolled' state and the IUT has sent the Authorization Request more than 1 time ensure that when the IUT receives an Authorization Response then the IUT stops sending Authorization Requests to AA	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_REP_04_BV
Summary	Check that IUT stops sending the Authorization Request message if maximum number of retry has been reached
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'enrolled' state and the IUT has started sending the Authorization Request ensure that when the IUT sent the PIXIT_AUTH_MAX_N1 Authorization Request messages then the IUT stops sending Authorization Requests	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_REP_05_BV
Summary	Check that IUT stops sending the Authorization Request message if timeout has been reached
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'enrolled' state and the IUT has started sending the Authorization Request at the time T1 ensure that when the IUT local time is reached the T1 + PIXIT_AUTH_TIMEOUT_TH2 then the IUT stops sending an Authorization Request messages	

5.2.4 CTL handling

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTL_01_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT trust the new RCA from the received ECTL
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.5
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT doesnot trust the CERT_RCA_NEW the IUT has received the TLM CTL containing the CERT_RCA_NEW ensure that when the IUT received a CAM signed with AT certificate signed with AA certificate signed with CERT_RCA_NEW then the IUT accepts this CAM	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTL_02_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT untrust the RCA when it is deleted from ECTL
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.5
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT trusting the CERT_RCA the IUT has received the TLM CTL not containing the CERT_RCA ensure that when the IUT received a CAM signed with AT certificate signed with AA certificate signed with CERT_RCA then the IUT rejects this CAM	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTL_03_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT trust the AA when it is received in RCA CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.5
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT does not have the CERT_AA_NEW the IUT has received the RCA CTL containing the CERT_AA_NEW and signed by CERT_RCA ensure that when the IUT received a CAM signed with AT certificate signed with CERT_AA_NEW digest then the IUT accepts this CAM	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTL_04_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT requests new ECTL when current one is expired
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.5
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT already downloaded theTLM CTL containing nextUpdate indicating timestamp T1 and containing CPOC URL ensure that when the T1 < CURRENT TIME then the IUT sends a request to the CPOC for a new CTL	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTL_05_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT requests new RCA CTL when current one is expired
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.5
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT already downloaded the RCA CTL containing nextUpdate indicating timestamp T1 and containing RCA DC URL ensure that when the T1 < CURRENT TIME then the IUT sends a request to the RCA DC for a new CTL	

5.2.5 CTL distribution

All test purposes in clause 5.2.5.1 may be included in the test sequence if following PICS items are set:

PICS_SECPKI_ECTL_BROADCAST = TRUE or PICS_SECPKI_CTL_BROADCAST = TRUE

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTLDIST_01_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT retransmits the newly received Delta CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 4.2.1.4
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-05.2
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to redistribute the Delta CTL and the IUT does not contain an CTL information ensure that when the IUT has received the Delta CTL then the IUT is started to broadcast the received Delta CTL	
NOTE: This TP is applied for both: ECTL and RootCA CTL handling behaviour.	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTLDIST_02_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT retransmits the updated Delta CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 4.2.1.4
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-05.2
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to redistribute the Delta CTL and the IUT contains an CTL information containing ctlSequence (***SN***) ensure that when the IUT has received the Delta CTL containing ctlSequence indicating value greater than ***SN*** then the IUT is started to broadcast the received Delta CTL	
NOTE: This TP is applied for both: ECTL and RootCA CTL handling behaviour.	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTLDIST_03_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT is using the proper BTP port to broadcast the Delta CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.4.4
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-05.2, ***X_PICS***
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P ***X_DISTRIBUTION*** distribution and the IUT has received the Delta ***X_DISTRIBUTION*** message ensure that when the IUT is triggered to broadcast the Delta ***X_DISTRIBUTION*** message then the IUT sends the ***X_MESSAGE*** using the BTP port 2014	

Permutation table

X	***X_DISTRIBUTION***	***X_MESSAGE***	***X_PICS***
A	ECTL	`TlmCertificateTrustListMessage`	PICS_SECPKI_ECTL_BROADCAST
B	RootCA CTL	`RcaCertificateTrustListMessage`	PICS_SECPKI_CTL_BROADCAST

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTLDIST_04_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT stops to redistribute the Delta CTL if anorther node is also sending it
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-05.2

Expected behaviour

with
the IUT is configured to support P2P Delta ***X_DISTRIBUTION*** distribution
and the IUT has started broadcasting the Delta ***X_DISTRIBUTION*** message
signed with ***X_CERTIFICATE***
and containing ctlSequence (***SN***)
ensure that
when
the IUT has received the Delta ***X_DISTRIBUTION***
signed with ***X_CERTIFICATE***
and containing ctlSequence
indicating value equal or higher than ***SN***
then
the IUT stops broadfcasting the Delta ***X_DISTRIBUTION***
signed with ***X_CERTIFICATE***
and containing ctlSequence (***SN***)

Permutation table

X	***X_DISTRIBUTION***	***X_CERTIFICATE***	***X_PICS***
A	ECTL	CERT_TLM	PICS_SECPKI_ECTL_BROADCAST
B	RootCA CTL	CERT_IUT_A_RCA	PICS_SECPKI_CTL_BROADCAST

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTLDIST_05_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT requests the Delta CTL using P2P protocol when no CTL information available
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.3.4.3
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-06.1

Expected behaviour

with
the IUT is configured to support P2P Delta CTL distribution
and the IUT contains valid TLM or/and RootCA certificate (***CERT***)
and the IUT does not contain any CTL information
ensure that
when
the IUT is triggered to request the CTL information for ***CERT***
then
the IUT starts sending Secured GN messages
containing `contributedExtensions`
containing an item of type `ContributedExtensionBlock`
containing `contributorId`
indicating `etsiHeaderInfoContributorId (2)`
containing an item of type `EtsiTs102941CtlRequest`
containing `issuerId`
indicating `HashedID8` of the ***CERT***
and not containing `lastKnownCtlSequence`

NOTE: This TP is applied for both: ECTL and RootCA CTL handling behaviour.

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTLDIST_06_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT requests the Delta CTL using P2P protocol when new CTL information is required
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.3.4.3
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-06.1
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P Delta CTL distribution and the IUT contains valid TLM or/and RootCA certificate (***CERT***) and the IUT contain the ***CERT*** CTL information containing `ctlSequence` indicating (***SN***) ensure that when the IUT is triggered to request the CTL information, associated with ***CERT*** then the IUT starts sending Secured GN messages containing `contributedExtensions` containing an item of type `ContributedExtensionBlock` containing `contributorId` indicating `etsiHeaderInfoContributorId (2)` containing an item of type `EtsiTs102941CtlRequest` containing `issuerId` indicating `HashedID8` of the ***CERT*** and containing `lastKnownCtlSequence` indicating ***SN***	
NOTE: This TP is applied for both: ECTL and RootCA CTL handling behaviour.	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTLDIST_07_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT requests the Delta CTL using P2P protocol when CTL information is expired
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.3.6
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-06.1
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P Delta CTL distribution and the IUT contains valid TLM or/and RootCA certificate (***CERT***) and the IUT contains the ***CERT*** CTL information containing ctlSequence indicating (***SN***) ensure that when the IUT is received the Secured GN Message containing `contributedExtensions` containing an item of type `ContributedExtensionBlock` containing `contributorId` indicating `etsiHeaderInfoContributorId (2)` containing an item of type `EtsiTs102941CtlRequest` containing `issuerId` indicating `HashedID8` of the ***CERT*** and containing `lastKnownCtlSequence` indicating value higher than ***SN*** then the IUT starts sending Secured GN messages containing `contributedExtensions` containing an item of type `ContributedExtensionBlock` containing `contributorId` indicating `etsiHeaderInfoContributorId (2)` containing an item of type `EtsiTs102941CtlRequest` containing `issuerId` indicating `HashedID8` of the ***CERT*** and containing `lastKnownCtlSequence` indicating ***SN***	
NOTE: This TP is applied for both: ECTL and RootCA CTL handling behaviour.	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTLDIST_08_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT starts broadcasting the Delta CTL when request is received using P2P protocol
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.3.6
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-06.2
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P Delta CTL distribution and the IUT contains valid TLM or/and RootCA certificate (***CERT***) and the IUT has received a Delta CTL message (***M***) signed using ***CERT*** and containing `ctlSequence` indicating (***SN***) ensure that when the IUT is received the Secured Message containing `contributedExtensions` containing an item of type `EtsiTs102941CtlRequest` containing `issuerId` indicating `HashedID8` of the ***CERT*** and containing `lastKnownCtlSequence` indicating value less than ***SN*** then the IUT starts broadcasting the Delta CTL (***M***)	
NOTE: This TP is applied for both: ECTL and RootCA CTL handling behaviour.	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTLDIST_09_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT stops broadcasting the Delta CTL when broadcasting period is expired
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.3.6
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-06.2
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P Delta CTL distribution and the IUT is configured to broadcast the Delta CTL during ***D1*** time and the IUT has started to broadcast a Delta CTL message at the time ***T*** ensure that when the IUT local time is reached the T + D1 then the IUT stops broadcasting the Delta CTL	
NOTE 1: This TP is applied for both: ECTL and RootCA CTL handling behaviour. NOTE 2: The ***D1*** value shall be provided as a PIXIT.	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CTLDIST_10_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT stops broadcasting the requested Delta CTL when broadcasting period is expired
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.3.6
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-06.2
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P Delta CTL distribution and the IUT is configured to broadcast the requested Delta CTL during ***D2*** time and the IUT has started to broadcast a Delta CTL message at the time ***T*** ensure that when the IUT local time is reached the ***T*** + ***D2*** then the IUT stops broadcasting the Delta CTL	
NOTE 1: This TP is applied for both: ECTL and RootCA CTL handling behaviour. NOTE 2: The ***D2*** value shall be provided as a PIXIT.	

5.2.6 CRL handling

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRL_01_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT accept the received CRL information
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 5.4.2
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA) and the IUT has not received yet the CRL information issued by the RootCA ensure that when the IUT received the CRL information from the DC then the IUT accepts the received CRL	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRL_02_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT can handle the revocation of its own AA
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 5.4.2
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA) and the IUT is authorized using AT certificate signed with CERT_IUT_A__B_AA ensure that when the IUT received the CRL information from the DC containing revocation of CERT_IUT_A_B_AA then the IUT switched to 'enrolled' state	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRL_03_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT can handle the revocation of its own EA
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 5.4.2
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is in 'authorized' state and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA) and the IUT been enrolled with EC certificate signed with CERT_IUT_A_EA certificate ensure that when the IUT the IUT received the CRL information from the DC containing revocation of CERT_IUT_A_EA then the IUT switches to the 'initial' state	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRL_04_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT can handle the revocation of its own RootCA
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 5.4.2
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is in 'authorized' state and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA) and the IUT been enrolled with EC certificate signed with EA certificate signed with CERT_IUT_A_RCA ensure that when the IUT the IUT received the CRL information from the DC containing revocation of CERT_IUT_A_RCA then the IUT switches to the 'initial' state	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRL_05_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT skips incoming messages when revoked AA certificate is in the signing chain of the current AT certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 5.4.2
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA) and the IUT has not received yet the CRL information issued by the RootCA and the IUT is authorized using AT certificate signed with CERT_IUT_A_AA and the IUT contains another AA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_B_AA) and the IUT has already accepted messages signed with AT certificate signed with CERT_IUT_A_B_AA and the IUT received the CRL information from the DC containing revocation of CERT_IUT_A_B_AA ensure that when the IUT receives a Secured Message signed with AT certificate signed with CERT_IUT_A_B_AA then the IUT discards this message	

5.2.7 CRL distribution

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRLDIST_01_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT starts broadcasting the CRL using P2P protocol when CRL information is received
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.4.2
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-07.2
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P CRL distribution and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA) and the IUT has not received yet the CRL information issued by the RootCA ensure that when the IUT received the CRL information from the DC containing `thisUpdate` (***T***) and containing `nextUpdate` (***N***) then the IUT starts broadcasting the received CRL	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRLDIST_02_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT is using the proper BTP port to broadcast the CRL
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.4.4
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-07.2
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P CRL distribution and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA) and the IUT has not received yet the CRL information issued by the RootCA ensure that when the IUT is triggered to broadcast the CRL then the IUT sends the `CertificateRevocationListMessage` using the BTP port 2015	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRLDIST_02_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT stops broadcasting the CRL when distribution time (d1) has been expired after receiving of CRL information
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clauses 5.4.2 and 5.4.3
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-07.2
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P CRL distribution and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA) and the IUT has already received the CRL information from DC at the time ***T*** and the IUT has started broadcasting the received CRL and the IUT is configured to limit the broadcasting time to ***D1*** ensure that when the IUT current time is equal or more than ***T+D1*** then the IUT stops broadcasting the CRL	
NOTE: The ***D1*** value shall be provided as a PIXIT	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRLDIST_03_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT stops broadcasting the CRL when the CRL became outdated because of the nextUpdate value
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.4.3
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-07.2
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P CRL distribution and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA) and the IUT has already received the CRL information from DC containing nextUpdate (***N***) and the IUT has started broadcasting the received CRL ensure that when the IUT current time is equal or more than ***N*** then the IUT stops broadcasting the CRL	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRLDIST_04_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT stops broadcasting the CRL when another station starts to broadcast the same or more recent CRL
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.4.3
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-07.2
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P CRL distribution and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA) and the IUT has already received the CRL containing thisUpdate (***T***) and the IUT has started broadcasting the received CRL ensure that when the IUT receives the CRL signed by CERT_IUT_A_RCA containing thisUpdate indicating the value equal or greate than ***T*** then the IUT stops broadcasting the CRL	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRLDIST_04_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT skips the lastKnownUpdate field in the P2P CRL request when no CRL information has been previously available
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.3.4.2
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-08.1
Expected behaviour	

with
the IUT is configured to support P2P CRL distribution
and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA)
and the IUT has never received a CRL information issued by the RootCA
ensure that
when
the IUT is triggered to request the CRL
then
the IUT starts sending Secured GN messages
containing `contributedExtensions`
containing an item of type `ContributedExtensionBlock`
containing `contributorId`
indicating `etsiHeaderInfoContributorId (2)`
containing an item of type `EtsiTs102941CrlRequest`
containing `issuerId`
indicating `HashedID8` of the CERT_IUT_A_RCA
and not containing `lastKnownUpdate`

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRLDIST_05_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT includes the lastKnownUpdate information in the P2P CRL request if the CRL information was previously available
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.3.4.2
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-08.1
Expected behaviour	

with
the IUT is configured to support P2P CRL distribution
and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA)
and the IUT has already received the CRL information issued by the RootCA
containing `thisUpdate` (***T***)
ensure that
when
the IUT is triggered to request the CRL
then
the IUT starts sending Secured GN messages
containing `contributedExtensions`
containing an item of type `ContributedExtensionBlock`
containing `contributorId`
indicating `etsiHeaderInfoContributorId (2)`
containing an item of type `EtsiTs102941CrlRequest`
containing `issuerId`
indicating `HashedID8` of the CERT_IUT_A_RCA
and containing `lastKnownUpdate`
indicating ***T***

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRLDIST_06_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT starts broadcasting the CRL using P2P protocol when CRL information has been requested by another ITS station
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.4.2
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-08.2
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P CRL distribution and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA) and the IUT has already received the CRL information issued by the RootCA and the IUT has already stopped broadcasting the CRL information ensure that when the IUT received the CRL request information issued by the RootCA not containing `thislastKnownUpdate` then the IUT starts broadcasting the received CRL	

TP Id	SECPKI_ITSS_CRLDIST_06_BV
Summary	Check that the IUT stops broadcasting the CRL when distribution time (d2) has been expired after receiving of CRL request
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.4.2
Configuration	CFG_CXL_P2P
PICS Selection	UC-SEC-08.2
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT is configured to support P2P CRL distribution and the IUT contains valid RootCA certificate (CERT_IUT_A_RCA) and the IUT has already received the CRL information request at the time ***T*** and the IUT has started broadcasting the CRL and the IUT is configured to limit the broadcasting time to ***D2*** ensure that when the IUT current time is equal or more than ***T+D1*** then the IUT stops broadcasting the CRL	
NOTE: The ***D1*** value shall be provided as a PIXIT.	

5.3 Common CA behaviour

5.3.0 Overview

All test purposes in the present clause may be included in the test sequence if one of the following PICS items are set:

PICS_SECPKI_IUT_RCA = TRUE; or

PICS_SECPKI_IUT_AA = TRUE; or

PICS_SECPKI_IUT_EA = TRUE.

5.3.1 Certificate validation

5.3.1.1 Basic certificate content

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_01_BV
Summary	Check that the issuing certificate has version 3
Reference	ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 6 IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clause 6.4.3
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY
Expected behaviour	
with CA is in 'operational' state ensure that when the CA is requested to issue the certificate then this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate containing version indicating 3	

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_01
Summary	Check that the issuing certificate has type explicit
Reference	ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 6 IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clause 6.4.3
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_EXPLICIT_CERTIFICATES
Expected behaviour	
with CA is in 'operational' state CA is initialized with the explicit certificate (CERT_IUT_A_CA) ensure that when the CA is requested to issue the explicit certificate then this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate containing version indicating 3 and containing type indicating 'explicit' and containing toBeSigned containing verifyKeyIndicator containing verificationKey and containing signature	

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_02
Summary	Check that the CA, been authorized using explicit certificate, is able to issue an implicit certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 6 IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clause 6.4.3
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_IMPLICIT_CERTIFICATES AND PICS_SEC_EXPLICIT_CERTIFICATES
Expected behaviour	

with
    CA is in 'operational' state
    CA is initialized with the explicit certificate (**CERT_IUT_A_CA**)
ensure that
    when
        the CA is requested to issue the implicit certificate
    then
        this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate
            containing version
                indicating 3
            containing type
                indicating 'implicit'
            and containing toBeSigned
                containing verifyKeyIndicator
                    containing reconstructionValue
            and not containing signature

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_03
Summary	Check that the CA, been authorized using explicit certificate, is able to issue an implicit certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 6 IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clause 6.4.3
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_IMPLICIT_CERTIFICATES
Expected behaviour	

with
    CA is in 'operational' state
    CA is initialized with the implicit certificate (**CERT_IUT_I_CA**)
ensure that
    when
        the CA is requested to issue the implicit certificate
    then
        this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate
            containing version
                indicating 3
            containing type
                indicating 'implicit'
            and containing toBeSigned
                containing verifyKeyIndicator
                    containing reconstructionValue
            and not containing signature

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BO_01
Summary	Check that the CA, been authorized using implicit certificate, does not issue an explicit certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 6 IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clause 6.4.3
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_IMPLICIT_CERTIFICATES AND PICS_SEC_EXPLICIT_CERTIFICATES
Expected behaviour	
with CA is in 'operational' state CA is initialized with the implicit certificate (**CERT_IUT_I_CA**) ensure that when the CA is requested to issue the explicit certificate then the CA does not issue the certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_03_BV
Summary	Check that CA issues certificate conformed to ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 6
Reference	ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 6
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY
Expected behaviour	
with CA is in 'operational' state ensure that when the CA is issued the certificate then this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate containing toBeSigned containing id indicating 'none' or 'name' and containing cracaId indicating '000000'H and containing crlSeries indicating '0'D and not containing certRequestPermissions and not containing canRequestRollover	

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_04_BV_X
Summary	Check that the issuer of certificates is referenced using digest Check that right digest field is used to reference to the certificate
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clause 6.4.3
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND X_PICS

Expected behaviour

with
  CA is in 'operational' state
  and CA is authorized with CA certificate C_ISSUER
ensure that
  when
    the CA is issued the explicit certificate
  then
    this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate
      containing issuer
        containing ***X_DIGEST***
          indicating last 8 bytes of the hash of the certificate calculated using ***X_ALGORITHM***
            referenced to certificate C_ISSUER
      and containing toBeSigned
        containing verifyKeyIndicator
          containing verificationKey
            containing ***X_KEY***

Permutation table

X	*X_DIGEST*	*X_ALGORITM*	*X_KEY*	*X_PICS*
A	sha256AndDigest	SHA-256	ecdsaNistP256 or ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1	PICS_SEC_SHA256 AND PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P256R1
B	sha384AndDigest	SHA-384	ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1	PICS_SEC_SHA384 AND PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P384R1

5.3.1.2 Check certificate region validity restriction

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_05_BV
Summary	Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed circular region validity restriction
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clauses 6.4.20, 6.4.17 and 5.1.2.4
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_CIRCULAR_REGION

Expected behaviour

with
  CA is in 'operational' state
  the CA is authorized with CA certificate
    containing toBeSigned
      containing region
        indicating REGION
ensure that
  when
    the CA is requested to issue the certificate
      containing circular region restriction
  then
    the CA issues the certificate of type EtsiTs103097Certificate
      containing toBeSigned
        containing region
          containing circularRegion
            containing center
              indicating a point inside the REGION
            and containing radius
              indicating a value when all points of the circle are inside the REGION

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_06_BV
Summary	Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed rectangular region validity restriction
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clauses 6.4.20, 6.4.17 and 5.1.2.4
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_RECTANGULAR_REGION
Expected behaviour	
with CA is in 'operational' state the CA is authorized with CA certificate containing toBeSigned containing region indicating REGION ensure that when the CA is requested to issue the certificate containing rectangular region restriction then the CA issues the certificate of type EtsiTs103097Certificate containing toBeSigned containing region containing rectangularRegion containing items of type RectangularRegion containing northwest indicating a point inside the REGION and containing southeast indicating a point on the south and east from northwest and inside the REGION	

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_07_BV
Summary	Check that CA is able to issue certificate with polygonal region validity restriction where: - the polygonal certificate validity region contains at least three points - the polygonal certificate validity region does not contain intersections - the polygonal certificate validity region is inside the validity region of the issuing certificate
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clauses 6.4.21, 6.4.17 and 5.1.2.4
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_POLYGONAL_REGION
Expected behaviour	
with CA is in 'operational' state the CA is authorized with CA certificate containing toBeSigned containing region indicating REGION ensure that when the CA is requested to issue the certificate containing polygonal region validity restriction then the CA issues the certificate of type EtsiTs103097Certificate containing toBeSigned containing region containing polygonalRegion containing more than 2 items of type TwoDLocation indicating points inside the REGION and indicating unintercepting segments	

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_08_BV
Summary	Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with identified region validity restriction contains values that correspond to numeric country codes as defined by United Nations Statistics Division [i.8]
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clause 6.4.23
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_IDENTIFIED_REGION

Expected behaviour

with
- CA is in 'operational' state
- the CA is authorized with CA certificate
  - containing toBeSigned
    - containing region
      - indicating REGION

ensure that
- when
  - the CA is requested to issue the certificate
    - containing identified region validity restriction
      - indicating country or area ***COUNTRY***
- then
  - the CA issued the certificate of type EtsiTs103097Certificate
    - containing toBeSigned
      - containing region
        - containing identifiedRegion
          - containing 1 entry of type IdentifiedRegion
            - containing countryOnly
              - indicating integer representation of the identifier of country or area ***COUNTRY***
            - or containing countryAndRegions
              - containing countryOnly
                - indicating integer representation of the identifier of country or area ***COUNTRY***
            - or containing countryAndSubregions
              - containing country
                - indicating integer representation of the identifier of country or area ***COUNTRY***

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_09_BV
Summary	Check that the identified region validity restriction of the subordinate certificate is included in the identified region validity restriction of the issuing certificate
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clauses 6.4.17 and 5.1.2.4
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_IDENTIFIED_REGION

Expected behaviour

with
the CA is in 'operational' state
and the CA is authorized with CA certificate
containing toBeSigned
containing region
containing identifiedRegion
containing countryOnly
indicating ***COUNTRY***
or containing countryAndRegions
containing countryOnly
indicating ***COUNTRY***
and containing regions
indicating ***REGIONS***
or containing countryAndSubregions
containing country
indicating ***COUNTRY***
and containing regionAndSubregions
indicating ***REGIONS*** and ***SUBREGIONS***
ensure that
when
the CA issued the certificate
containing toBeSigned
containing region
containing identifiedRegion
then
this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate
containing toBeSigned
containing region
containing identifiedRegion
containing countryOnly
indicating value = ***COUNTRY***
or containing countryAndRegions
containing countryOnly
indicating value = ***COUNTRY***
and containing regions
containing region identifiers contained in ***REGIONS***
or containing countryAndSubregions
containing country
indicating value = ***COUNTRY***
and containing regionAndSubregions
containing region identifiers contained in ***REGIONS***
and containing subRegion identifiers contained in ***SUBREGIONS*** for every region

5.3.1.3 Check ECC point type of the certificate signature

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_ CERTGEN_10_BV_***XX***
Summary	Check that the certificate signature contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or x_coordinate_only
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clauses 6.3.29, 6.3.30 and 6.3.31
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_EXPLICIT_CERTIFICATES AND ***X_PICS***
Expected behaviour	
with the CA is in 'operational' state ensure that when the CA issued the explicit certificate then this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate containing signature containing ***X_SIGNATURE*** containing rSig containing x-only or containing compressed-y-0 or containing compressed-y-1	
Permutation table	

XX	***X_SIGNATURE***	***X_PICS***
A	ecdsaNistP256Signature	
B	ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1Signature	PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P256R1
C	ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1Signature	PICS_SEC_SHA384 AND PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P384R1

5.3.1.4 Check ECC point type of the certificate public keys

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_11_BV
Summary	Check that the certificate verification key contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or uncompressed
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clause 6.4.38
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_EXPLICIT_CERTIFICATES AND ***X_PICS***
Expected behaviour	
with the CA is in 'operational' state ensure that when the CA issued the explicit certificate then this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate containing toBeSigned containing verifyKeyIndicator containing verificationKey containing ***X_KEY*** containing uncompressed or containing compressed-y-0 or containing compressed-y-1	
Permutation table	

XX	***X_KEY***	***X_PICS***
A	ecdsaNistP256	
B	ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1	PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P256R1
C	ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1	PICS_SEC_SHA384 AND PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P384R1

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_12_BV
Summary	Check that the certificate encryption key contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or uncompressed
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clause 6.4.38
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY

Expected behaviour

with
the CA is in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the CA issued the certificate
then
this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate
containing toBeSigned
containing encryptionKey
containing publicKey
containing ***X_KEY***
containing uncompressed
or containing compressed-y-0
or containing compressed-y-1

Permutation table

XX	***X_KEY***	***X_PICS***
A	eciesNistP256	
B	eciesBrainpoolP256r1	PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P256R1

5.3.1.5 Verify certificate signatures

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_13_BV_01
Summary	Check the explicit certificate signature
Reference	ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 6
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_EXPLICIT_CERTIFICATES AND ***X_PICS***

Expected behaviour

with
the CA is in 'operational' state
and the CA is authorized with explicit certificate
containing toBeSigned
containing verifyKeyIndicator
containing verificationKey
containing ***X_KEY***
ensure that
when
the CA issued the explicit certificate
then
this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate
containing issuer
referencing the certificate
containing toBeSigned
containing verifyKeyIndicator
containing verificationKey
containing ***X_KEY***
indicating KEY
and containing signature
containing ***X_SIGNATURE***
verifiable using KEY

Permutation table

XX	***X_KEY***	***X_SIGNATURE***	***X_PICS***
A	ecdsaNistP256	ecdsaNistP256Signature	
B	ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1	ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1Signature	PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P256R1
C	ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1	ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1Signature	PICS_SEC_SHA384 AND PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P384R1

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_13_BV_02
Summary	Check the explicit certificate signature
Reference	ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 6
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY AND PICS_SEC_EXPLICIT_CERTIFICATES AND ***X_PICS***

Expected behaviour

with
the CA is in 'operational' state
and the CA is authorized with explicit certificate
containing toBeSigned
containing verifyKeyIndicator
containing verificationKey
containing ***X_KEY***
indicating KEY
and the CA issued the implicit certificate of type EtsiTs103097Certificate (CERT)
not containing signature
and containing issuer
referencing the certificate
containing toBeSigned
containing verifyKeyIndicator
containing reconstructionValue
indicating VALUE
ensure that
when
the CA is calculated the digital signature
using the private key associated with the CERT
then
this signature can be verified using public key
reconstructed using VALUE and KEY

Permutation table

XX	***X_KEY***	***X_PICS***
A	ecdsaNistP256	
B	ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1	PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P256R1
C	ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1	PICS_SEC_SHA384 AND PICS_SEC_BRAINPOOL_P384R1

5.3.1.6 Verify certificate permissions

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_14_BV
Summary	Check that all PSID entries of the appPermissions component of the certificate are unique
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clauses 6.4.28 and 5.1.2.4
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY

Expected behaviour

with
the CA is in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the CA issued the certificate
containing toBeSigned
containing appPermissions
then
this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate
containing toBeSigned
containing appPermissions
containing items of type PsidSsp
containing psid
indicating unique values in this sequence

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_15_BV
Summary	Check that all PSID entries of the appPermissions component of the certificate are also contained in the certIssuePermissions component in the issuing certificate
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clauses 6.4.28 and 5.1.2.4
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY
Expected behaviour	

```
with
    the CA is in 'operational' state
ensure that
    when
        the CA issued the certificate
            containing toBeSigned
                containing appPermissions
    then
        this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate
            containing issuer
                referenced to the certificate
                    containing toBeSigned
                        containing certIssuePermissions
                            containing items of type PsidGroupPermissions
                                containing eeType
                                    indicating app(0)
                                and containing subjectPermissions
                                    containing explicit
                                        containing items of type PsidSspRange
                                            indicating X_PSID_RANGE_LIST
                                    or containing all
            and containing toBeSigned
                containing appPermissions
                    containing items of type PsidSsp
                        containing psid
                            contained in the X_PSID_RANGE_LIST
                                as a psid
```

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_16_BV
Summary	Check that all PSID entries of the certIssuePermissions component of the certificate are unique
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clauses 6.4.28 and 5.1.2.4
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY
Expected behaviour	

```
with
    the CA is in 'operational' state
ensure that
    when
        the CA issued the certificate
            containing toBeSigned
                containing certIssuePermissions
    then
        this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate
            containing toBeSigned
                containing certIssuePermissions
                    containing items of type PsidGroupPermissions
                        containing subjectPermissions
                            containing explicit
                                containing items of type PsidSspRange
                                    containing psid
                                        indicating unique values in this sequence
```

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_17_BV
Summary	Check that SSP field in each entry of the appPermissions component of the AT certificate is equal to or a subset of the SSP Range in the corresponding issuing entry
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clauses 6.4.28 and 5.1.2.4
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY

Expected behaviour

```
with
    the CA is in 'operational' state
ensure that
  when
    the CA issued the certificate
      containing toBeSigned
        containing appPermissions
  then
    this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate
      containing issuer
        referenced to the certificate
          containing toBeSigned
            containing certIssuePermissions
              containing items of type PsidGroupPermissions
                containing eeType
                  indicating app(0)
                and containing subjectPermissions
                  containing explicit
                    containing items of type PsidSspRange
                      containing psid
                        indicating X_PSID_AA
                      containing sspRange
                        indicating X_SSP_AA [ X_PSID_AA ]
                  or containing all
      containing toBeSigned
        containing appPermissions
          containing items of type PsidSsp
            containing psid
              indicating value equal to X_PSID_AA
            containing ssp
              indicating value permitted by X_SSP_AA [ X_PSID_AA ]
```

5.3.1.7 Check time validity restriction in the chain

TP Id	SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_18_BV
Summary	Check that the validityPeriod of the subordinate certificate is inside the validityPeriod of the issuing certificate
Reference	IEEE Std 1609.2 [3], clause 5.1.2.4
PICS Selection	PICS_GN_SECURITY
Expected behaviour	
with the CA is in 'operational' state and the CA is authorized with CA certificate containing toBeSigned containing validityPeriod containing start indicating X_START_VALIDITY_CA containing duration indicating X_DURATION_CA ensure that when the IUT issued the certificate then this certificate is of type EtsiTs103097Certificate containing toBeSigned containing validityPeriod containing start indicating X_START_VALIDITY (X_START_VALIDITY >= X_START_VALIDITY_CA) containing duration indicating value <= X_START_VALIDITY_CA + X_DURATION_CA - X_START_VALIDITY	

5.4 EA behaviour

5.4.0 Overview

All test purposes in the present clause may be included in the test sequence if the following PICS items is set:

PICS_SECPKI_IUT_EA = TRUE

5.4.1 Enrolment request handling

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV
Summary	The EnrolmentResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the ITS-S across the interface at reference point S3 in response to a received EnrolmentRequest message
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the EA is in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage then the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage across the interface at reference point S3	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI
Summary	Check that EA does not accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
the EA is in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage
containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
containing signer
containing digest
indicating HashedId8 value
referenced the certificate (CERT)
containing appPermissions
not containing an item of type PsidSsp
containing psid
indicating AID_CERT_REQ
or containing an item of type PsidSsp
containing psid
indicating AID_CERT_REQ
and containing ssp
containing opaque[0] (version)
indicating other value than 1
or containing opaque[1] (value)
indicating 'Enrolment Request' (bit 1) set to 0
then
the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage
containing InnerECResponse
containing responseCode
indicating 'deniedpermissions'

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_04_BI
Summary	Enroll the ITS-Station, but the outer signature, created with the canonical private key, can not be verified with the registered canonical public key
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
the EA is in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage
containing an outer signature
signed with an unknown canonical private key
then
the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage
containing InnerECResponse
containing responseCode
indicating 'invalidsignature'
and not containing a certificate

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_05_BI
Summary	Enroll an ITS-Station, but with a canonical-ID, that is not registered
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
the EA is in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage
containing an InnerEcRequest
containing Hostname
indicating an unknown canonical-ID
then
the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage
containing InnerECResponse
containing responseCode
indicating 'deniedpermissions'
and not containing a certificate

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_06_BI
Summary	Enroll the ITS-Station, but the CSR requests more permissions than the issuer allows, i.e. request for security management SSP bit which is not set in the EA SSP
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
the EA is in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage
containing an InnerEcRequest
containing SSP
indicating more permissions than EA allows
then
the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage
containing InnerECResponse
containing responseCode
indicating 'deniedpermissions'
and not containing a certificate

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_07_BI
Summary	Enroll the ITS-Station, but the CSR requests a AID permission that the issuer does not allow
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
the EA is in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage
containing an InnerEcRequest
containing SSP
containing an AID permission not authorized by EA
then
the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage
containing InnerECResponse
containing responseCode
indicating 'deniedpermissions'
and not containing a certificate

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_08_BI
Summary	Enroll the ITS-Station, but the expiring date of the CSR is before the start date of the EA
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1]
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the EA is in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage containing an InnerEcRequest containing ValidityPeriod indicating a value less than the start date of the EA then the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage containing InnerECResponse containing responseCode indicating 'deniedpermissions' and not containing a certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_09_BI
Summary	EEnroll the ITS-Station, but the start date of the CSR is before the start date of the EA
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1]
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the EA is in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage containing an InnerEcRequest containing ValidityPeriod containing start date indicating a value less than the start date of the EA then the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage containing InnerECResponse containing responseCode indicating 'deniedpermissions' and not containing a certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_10_BI
Summary	Enroll the ITS-Station, but expiring date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EA
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1]
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the EA is in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage containing an InnerEcRequest containing ValidityPeriod indicating a value greater than the ValidityPeriod of the EA then the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage containing InnerECResponse containing responseCode indicating 'deniedpermissions' and not containing a certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_11_BI
Summary	Enroll the ITS-Station, but the start date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EA
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1]
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the EA is in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage containing an InnerEcRequest containing ValidityPeriod containing start date indicating a value greater than the start date of the EA then the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage containing InnerECResponse containing responseCode indicating 'deniedpermissions' and not containing a certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_12_BI
Summary	Enroll the ITS-Station, but the lifetime of the EC would be grater than allowed (considering values in C-ITS CP)
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1]
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the EA is in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage containing an InnerEcRequest containing ValidityPeriod indicating a value greater than 100 years then the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage containing InnerECResponse containing responseCode indicating 'deniedpermissions' and not containing a certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_13_BI
Summary	Enroll the ITS-Station, but the inner PoP signature in the CSR, created with the EC private key, can not be verified with the provided public key
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1]
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the EA is in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage containing an InnerEcRequest signed with a private key SIGN_POP_PRIVATE_KEY and containing public verification keys indicating a value which does not match with the private key SIGN_POP_PRIVATE_KEY then the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage containing InnerECResponse containing responseCode indicating 'invalidsignature' and not containing a certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_14_BV
Summary	Check that EA send the same response for the repeated EC request
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT_RETRY
Expected behaviour	
with the EA is in 'operational' state and the EA already received EnrolmentRequestMessage (***REQ***) having checksum (**CS)** and the EA has sent the EnrolmentResponseMessage (***RES***) containing responseCode indicating 0K ensure that when the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage having checksum indicating value equal to ***CS*** then the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage indicating ***RES***	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_15_BV
Summary	Check that EA does not accept emrollment when message generation time is too far in the past
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1.4
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT_RETRY
Expected behaviour	
with the EA is in 'operational' state and the EA already received the EnrolmentRequestMessage (***REQ***) containing generationTime ***TG*** and having checksum (**CS)** ensure that when the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage at the moment ***TR2*** indicating ***TR2*** > ***TG*** + ***PIXIT_EA_ENROLLMENT_TIMEOUT*** and having checksum indicating value equal to ***CS*** then the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage containing responseCode indicating `deniedrequest`	
NOTE: PIXIT_EA_ENROLLMENT_TIMEOUT shall be set as a TP parameter.	

5.4.2 Enrolment response

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV
Summary	The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 [2] approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage containing encKey containing an encrypted AES key (SYMKEY) then the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage containing cipherText being encrypted using SYMKEY	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_02_BV
Summary	The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 [2] approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage containing encKey containing an encrypted AES key (SYMKEY) then the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage containing cipherText being encrypted using SYMKEY and using an ETSI TS 103 097 [2] approved algorithm	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_03_BV
Summary	The outermost structure is an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the ITS-S to encrypt the EnrolmentRequest message to which the response is built and containing the component ciphertext, once decrypted, contains an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT sends an EnrolmentResponseMessage as an answer for an EnrolmentRequestMessage then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo containing the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used to encrypt the EnrolmentRequestMessage and containing cipherText being an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_04_BV
Summary	If the ITS-S has been able to decrypt the content, this expected EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure shall contain hashId, tbsData, signer and signature. The hashId shall indicate the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2], the signer shall be declared as a digest, containing the HashedId8 of the EA certificate and the signature over tbsData shall be computed using the EA private key corresponding to its publicVerificationKey found in the referenced EA certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT sends an EnrolmentResponseMessage as an answer for an EnrolmentRequestMessage then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure containing hashId indicating the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2] and containing tbsData and containing signer declared as a digest containing the HashedId8 of the EA certificate and containing signature computed over tbsData using the EA private key corresponding to the publicVerificationKey found in the referenced EA certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_05_BV
Summary	Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, the psid shall be set to "secured certificate request" as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 [i.2] and the generationTime shall be present
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT sends an EnrolmentResponseMessage as an answer for an EnrolmentRequestMessage then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure containing tbsData containing headerInfo containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ and containing generationTime	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_06_BV
Summary	Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, aside from psid and generationTime, all other components of the component tbsData.headerInfo not used and absent
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT sends an EnrolmentResponseMessage as an answer for an EnrolmentRequestMessage then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure containing tbsData containing headerInfo containing psid and containing generationTime and not containing any other component of tbsData.headerInfo	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_07_BV
Summary	The EtsiTS102941Data shall contain the version set to v1 (integer value set to 1) and the content set to InnerECResponse
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT sends an EnrolmentResponseMessage as an answer for an EnrolmentRequestMessage then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure containing tbsData containing EtsiTS102941Data containing version indicating v1 (integer value set to 1)	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_08_BV
Summary	The InnerECResponse shall contain the requestHash, which is the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the EtsiTs103097Data - Signed structure received in the request and a responseCode indicating the result of the request
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT sends an EnrolmentResponseMessage as an answer for an EnrolmentRequestMessage then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure containing tbsData containing EtsiTS102941Data containing InnerECResponse containing requestHash indicating the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure received in the request and containing responseCode	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_09_BV
Summary	If the responseCode is 0, the InnerECResponse shall also contain an (enrolment) certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentResponseMessage containing a responseCode indicating 0 then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure containing tbsData containing EtsiTS102941Data containing InnerECResponse containing an enrolment certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_10_BV
Summary	If the responseCode is different than 0, the InnerECResponse shall not contain a certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.2.2
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentResponseMessage containing a responseCode indicating a value different than 0 then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure containing tbsData containing EtsiTS102941Data containing InnerECResponse not containing a certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_11_BV
Summary	Check that signing of Enrolment response message is permitted by the EA certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT sends an EnrolmentResponseMessage as an answer for an EnrolmentRequestMessage then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure containing signer declared as a digest containing the HashedId8 of the EA certificate containing appPermissions containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ and containing ssp containing opaque[0] (version) indicating 1 containing opaque[1] (value) indicating bit 'Enrolment Response' (5) set to 1	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_ENR_12_BV
Summary	Check that generated EC certificate contains only allowed permissions
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentResponseMessage containing a certificate (EC_CERT) then the EC_CERT containing appPermissions containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ and containing ssp containing opaque[0] (version) indicating 1 containing opaque[1] (value) indicating 'Enrolment Request' (bit 0) set to 1 indicating 'Authorization Request' (bit 1) set to 1 indicating other bits set to 0 and NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CTL and NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CRL	

5.4.3 Authorization validation request handling

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_01_BV
Summary	The AuthorizationValidationResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the AA across the interface at reference point S4 in response to a received AuthorizationValidationRequest message
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.2
Configuration	CFG_AVALID_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT receives a AuthorizationValidationRequest message then the IUT sends a AuthorizationValidationResponse message across the reference point S4 to the AA	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI
Summary	Check that EA does not accept Authorization Validation Request when SharedAtRequest is signed with certificate without appropriate permissions
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the IUT receives an AuthorizationValidationRequestMessage
      containing EtsiTs102941Data
        containing ecSignature
          containing signer
            containing digest
              indicating HashedId8 of the certificate EC certificate
                containing appPermissions
                  not containing an item of type PsidSsp
                    containing psid
                      indicating AID_CERT_REQ
                  or containing an item of type PsidSsp
                    containing psid
                      indicating AID_CERT_REQ
                    and containing ssp
                      containing opaque[0] (version)
                        indicating other value than 1
                      or containing opaque[1] (value)
                        indicating 'Authorization Request' (bit 2) set to 0
  then
    the IUT answers with an AuthorisationValidationResponseMessage
      containing responseCode
        indicating 'deniedpermissions'

5.4.4 Authorization validation response

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_01_BV
Summary	The EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted is built with the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the ITS-S to encrypt the AuthorizationRequest message to which the response is built and the component ciphertext containing the encrypted representation of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed. The encryption uses a ETSI TS 103 097 [2] approved algorithm
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.2 ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 7
Configuration	CFG_AVALID_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the IUT receives a AuthorizationValidationRequest message
    containing encKey
      containing the encrypted symmetric data encryption key (SYMKEY)
  then
    the IUT sends a AuthorizationValidationResponse message
      containing EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
        containing recipients
          containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo
            indicating the HashedId8 of SYMKEY
        and containing ciphertext
          containing EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
            being encrypted using SYMKEY and an ETSI TS 103 097 [2] approved algorithm

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_02_BV
Summary	To read an authorization validation response, the AA shall receive an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure, containing a EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure, containing a EtsiTs102941Data structure, containing an AuthorizationValidationResponse structure
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.2
Configuration	CFG_AVALID_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT receives a AuthorizationValidationRequest message then the IUT sends a AuthorizationValidationResponse message containing EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing EtsiTs102941Data containing AuthorizationValidationResponse	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_03_BV
Summary	The AuthorizationValidationResponse structure contains the requestHash being the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure received in the AuthorizationValidationRequest and a responseCode
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.2
Configuration	CFG_AVALID_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT receives a AuthorizationValidationRequest message containing EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure (REQDSS) then the IUT sends a AuthorizationValidationResponse message containing EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing EtsiTs102941Data containing AuthorizationValidationResponse containing requestHash indicating the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of REQDSS and containing responseCode	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_04_BV
Summary	If the responseCode is 0, the AuthorizationValidationResponse structure contains the component confirmedSubjectAttributes with the attributes the EA wishes to confirm, except for certIssuePermissions which is not allowed to be present
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.2
Configuration	CFG_AVALID_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT receives a AuthorizationValidationRequest message and the IUT responds with a AuthorizationValidationResponse message containing AuthorizationValidationResponse containing responseCode indicating 0 then the sent AuthorizationValidationResponse message contains an AuthorizationValidationResponse structure containing confirmedSubjectAttributes not containing certIssuePermissions	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_05_BV
Summary	If the responseCode is different than 0, the AuthorizationValidationResponse structure does not contain the component confirmedSubjectAttributes
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.2
Configuration	CFG_AVALID_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT receives a AuthorizationValidationRequest message and the IUT responds with a AuthorizationValidationResponse message containing AuthorizationValidationResponse containing responseCode indicating a value different than 0 then the sent AuthorizationValidationResponse message contains an AuthorizationValidationResponse structure not containing confirmedSubjectAttributes	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_06_BV
Summary	The component version of the EtsiTs102941Data structure is set to v1 (integer value set to 1)
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.2
Configuration	CFG_AVALID_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT receives a AuthorizationValidationRequest message then the IUT sends a AuthorizationValidationResponse message containing EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing EtsiTs102941Data containing version indicating v1 (integer value set to 1)	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_07_BV
Summary	EtsiTs103097Data-Signed.tbsData contains the EtsiTs102941Data as payload and the headerInfo containing psid and generationTime. The psid shall be set to "secured certificate request" as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 [i.2] and the generationTime shall be present. All other components of the component tbsdata.headerInfo are not used and absent
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.2
Configuration	CFG_AVALID_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT receives a AuthorizationValidationRequest message then the IUT sends a AuthorizationValidationResponse message containing EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing tbsData containing headerInfo containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ and containing generationTime and not containing any other component of tbsdata.headerInfo	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_08_BV
Summary	EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure shall contain hashId, tbsData, signer and signature. The hashId shall indicate the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2], the signer shall be declared as a digest, containing the HashedId8 of the EA certificate and the signature over tbsData shall be computed using the EA private key corresponding to its publicVerificationKey found in the referenced EA certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.2
Configuration	CFG_AVALID_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the IUT receives a AuthorizationValidationRequest message
  then
    the IUT sends a AuthorizationValidationResponse message
      containing an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure
        containing hashId
          indicating the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2]
        and containing tbsData
        and containing signer
          declared as a digest
            containing the HashedId8 of the EA certificate
        and containing signature
          computed over tbsData
            using the EA private key
              corresponding to the publicVerificationKey found in the referenced EA certificate

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_09_BV
Summary	Check that signing of Authorization Validation response message is permitted by the EA certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the IUT is requested to send an AuthorizationValidationResponseMessage
  then
    the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure
      containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure
        containing signer
          containing digest
            indicating HashedId8 of the EA certificate
              containing appPermissions
                containing an item of type PsidSsp
                  containing psid
                    indicating AID_CERT_REQ
                  and containing ssp
                    containing opaque[0] (version)
                      indicating 1
                    containing opaque[1] (value)
                      indicating 'Authorisation Validation Response' (bit 4) set to 1

5.4.5 CA Certificate Request

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_CERTGEN_01_BV
Summary	SubCA certificate requests of the EA are transported to the RCA using CACertificateRequest messages across the reference point S10
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage then the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage across the reference point S10 to the RCA	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_CERTGEN_02_BV
Summary	The application form should include the digital fingerprint of the CACertificateRequestMessage in printable format. The digital fingerprint of the CACertificateRequestMessage is computed using a ETSI TS 103 097 [2] approved hash algorithm
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initial' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage then the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage containing a signature (SIG) being computed using a ETSI TS 103 097 [2] approved hash algorithm and the IUT exports the digital fingerprint SIG in a printable format.	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_CERTGEN_03_BV
Summary	The hashId shall indicate the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2], the signer is set to 'self' and the signature over the tbsData is computed using the private key corresponding to the new verificationKey to be certified (i.e. the request is self-signed)
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1 ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 7
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	

Expected behaviour

with
the IUT being in the 'initial' state
ensure that
when
the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage
then
the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage
being an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure
containing hashId
indicating the hash algorithm to be used
and containing signer
indicating 'self'
and containing tbsData
containing CaCertificateRequest
containing publicKeys
containing verification_key (VKEY)
and containing signature
computed over tbsData using the private key corresponding to the verificationKey (VKEY)

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_CERTGEN_04_BV
Summary	An ECC private key is randomly generated, the corresponding public key (verificationKey) is provided to be included in the CaCertificateRequest. An ECC encryption private key is randomly generated, the corresponding public key (encryptionKey) is provided to be included in the CACertificateRequest. CaCertificateRequest.publicKeys shall contain verification_key and encryption_key
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	

Expected behaviour

with
the IUT being in the 'initial' state
ensure that
when
the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage
then
the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage
containing CaCertificateRequest
containing publicKeys
containing verification_key
and containing encryption_key

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_CERTGEN_05_BV
Summary	The EtsiTs102941Data structure is built with version set to v1 (integer value set to 1)
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initial' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage then the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage containing EtsiTs102941Data containing version indicating v1 (integer value set to 1)	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_CERTGEN_06_BV
Summary	CaCertificateRequest.requestedSubjectAttributes shall contain the requested certificates attributes as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2] clause 7.2.4
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1 ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 7.2.4.
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initial' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage then the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage containing CaCertificateRequest containing requestedSubjectAttributes as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2] clause 7.2.4.	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_CERTGEN_07_BV
Summary	EtsiTs103097Data-Signed.tbsData contains the EtsiTs102941Data as payload and the headerInfo containing psid and generationTime. The psid shall be set to "secured certificate request" as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 [i.2] and the generationTime shall be present. All other components of the component tbsdata.headerInfo are not used and absent
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initial' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage then the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage containing headerInfo containing psid indicating SEC_CERT_REQ and containing generationTime and not containing any other component of tbsdata.headerInfo	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_CERTGEN_08_BV
Summary	If the current private key has reached its end of validity period or is revoked, the SubCA shall restart the initial certificate application process
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_REKEY
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRekeyingMessage and SubCA certificate is no longer valid (due to end of validity or revocation) then the IUT switches to the "initial' state and sends a CACertificateRequestMessage	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_CERTGEN_09_BV
Summary	For the re-keying application to the RCA (CaCertificateRekeyingMessage), an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure is built, containing: hashId, tbsData, signer and signature. The hashId shall indicate the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2]. The signer declared as a digest, containing the hashedId8 of the EA certificate and the signature over tbsData is computed using the currently valid private key corresponding to the EA certificate (outer signature)
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1 ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 7
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_REKEY
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRekeyingMessage then the sends a CACertificateRekeyingMessage being an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure containing hashId indicating the hash algorithm to be used and containing tbsData and containing signer containing digest indicating HashedId8 of the SubCA certificate (CERT) and containing signature computed over tbsData using the private key corresponding to CERT	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_CERTGEN_10_BV
Summary	The (outer) tbsData of the CACertificateRekeyingMessage shall contain the CaCertificateRequestMessage as payload
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_REKEY
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRekeyingMessage then the sends a CACertificateRekeyingMessage containing tbsData containing CaCertificateRequestMessage	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_CERTGEN_11_BV
Summary	The (outer) tbsData of the CACertificateRekeyingMessage shall contain a headerInfo containing psid and generationTime. The psid shall be set to "secured certificate request" as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 [i.2] and the generationTime shall be present. All other components of the component tbsdata.headerInfo are not used and absent
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_REKEY
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRekeyingMessage then the sends a CACertificateRekeyingMessage containing tbsData containing headerInfo containing psid indicating SEC_CERT_REQ and containing generationTime and not containing any other component of tbsdata.headerInfo	

TP Id	SECPKI_EA_CERTGEN_12_BV
Summary	Check that the CaCertificateRekeyingMessage is permitted by CA certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_REKEY
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRekeyingMessage then the sends a CACertificateRekeyingMessage being an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure and containing tbsData and containing signer containing digest indicating HashedId8 of the CA certificate containing appPermissions containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ and containing ssp containing opaque[0] (version) indicating 1 containing opaque[1] (value) indicating 'CA Certificate Response' (bit 6) set to 1	

5.5 AA behaviour

5.5.0 Overview

All test purposes in the present clause may be included in the test sequence if the following PICS items is set:

PICS_SECPKI_IUT_AA = TRUE

5.5.1 Authorization request handling

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_01_BV
Summary	Check that the AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate Check that the AA is able to verify the inner signature Check that the AA is able to verify the request authenticity using the hmacKey verification Check that the AA sends the AuthorizationValidationRequest message to the correspondent EA
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE
Expected behaviour	

with
the AA in 'operational' state
authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
when
the IUT is received the EtsiTs103097Data message
containing content.encryptedData
containing recipients
containing the instance of RecipientInfo
containing certRecipInfo
containing recipientId
indicating HashedId8 of the certificate CERT_AA
and containing encKey
indicating symmetric key (S_KEY)
encrypted with the private key correspondent to the AA_ENC_PUB_KEY
and containing cyphertext (ENC_DATA)
containing encrypted representation of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
containing content.signedData
containing hashId
indicating valid hash algorithm
and containing signer
containing self
and containing tbsData (SIGNED_DATA)
containing payload
containing EtsiTs102941Data
containing content.authorizationRequest
containing publicKeys.verificationKey (V_KEY)
and containing hmacKey (HMAC)
and containing sharedAtRequest
containing keyTag (KEY_TAG)
and containing eaId (EA_ID)
indicating HashedId8 of the known EA certificate
and containing signature (SIGNATURE)
then
the IUT is able to decrypt the S_KEY
using the private key
corresponding to the AA_ENC_PUB_KEY
and the IUT is able to decrypt the cypthertext ENC_DATA
using the S_KEY
and the IUT is able to verify the signature over the SIGNED_DATA
using the V_KEY
and the IUT is able to verify integrity of HMAC and KEY_TAG
and the IUT sends the AuthorizationValidationRequest message to the EA
identified by the EA_ID

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV
Summary	Check that the AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate Check that the AA is able to verify the request authenticity using the hmacKey verification Check that the AA sends the AuthorizationValidationRequest message to the correspondent EA
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=FALSE

Expected behaviour

with
the AA in 'operational' state
authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
when
the IUT is received the EtsiTs103097Data message
containing content.encryptedData
containing recipients
containing the instance of RecipientInfo
containing certRecipInfo
containing recipientId
indicating HashedId8 of the certificate CERT_AA
and containing encKey
indicating symmetric key (S_KEY)
encrypted with the private key correspondent to the AA_ENC_PUB_KEY
and containing cyphertext (ENC_DATA)
containing EtsiTs102941Data
containing content.authorizationRequest
containing hmacKey (HMAC)
and containing sharedAtRequest
containing keyTag (KEY_TAG)
and containing eaId (EA_ID)
indicating HashedId8 of the known EA certificate
then
the IUT is able to decrypt the S_KEY
using the private key
corresponding to the AA_ENC_PUB_KEY
and the IUT is able to decrypt the cypthertext ENC_DATA
using the S_KEY
and the IUT is able to verify integrity of HMAC and KEY_TAG
and the IUT sends the AuthorizationValidationRequest message to the EA
identified by the EA_ID

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_03_BI
Summary	Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it is not addressed to this AA
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
the AA in 'operational' state
authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
when
the IUT is received the EtsiTs103097Data message
containing content.encryptedData
containing recipients
containing only one instance of RecipientInfo
containing certRecipInfo
containing recipientId
indicating value
NOT equal to the HashedId8 of the certificate CERT_AA
and containing encKey
indicating symmetric key (S_KEY)
encrypted with the private key correspondent to the AA_ENC_PUB_KEY
then
the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_04_BI
Summary	Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to decrypt the encKey
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
the AA in 'operational' state
authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
when
the IUT is received the EtsiTs103097Data message
containing content.encryptedData
containing recipients
containing the instance of RecipientInfo
containing certRecipInfo
containing recipientId
indicating value
equal to the HashedId8 of the certificate CERT_AA
and containing encKey
indicating symmetric key (S_KEY)
encrypted with the OTHER private key than the correspondent to the AA_ENC_PUB_KEY
then
the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_05_BI
Summary	Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to decrypt the cyphertext
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

```
with
    the AA in 'operational' state
        authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
            containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
    when
        the IUT is received the EtsiTs103097Data message
            containing content.encryptedData
                containing recipients[0].encKey
                    indicating encrypted symmetric key (S_KEY)
                and containing cyphertext (ENC_DATA)
                    encrypted with the OTHER key than S_KEY
    then
        and the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message to the correspondent EA
```

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_06_BI
Summary	Check that the AA rejects the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to verify the POP signature
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE
Expected behaviour	

```
with
    the AA in 'operational' state
        authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
            containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
    when
        the IUT is received the EtsiTs103097Data message
            containing content.encryptedData.cyphertext
                containing encrypted representation of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed (SIGNED_DATA)
                    containing content.signedData
                        containing tbsData
                            containing payload
                                containing EtsiTs102941Data
                                    containing content.authorizationRequest
                                        containing publicKeys.verificationKey (V_KEY)
                        and containing signature (SIGNATURE)
                            indicating value calculated with OTHER key than private key correspondent to V_KEY
    then
        and the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message
        and the IUT sends to the TS the AuthorizationResponse message
            containing authorizationResponse
                containing requestHash
                    indicating the leftmost 16 bits of the SHA256 value
                        calculated over the SIGNED_DATA
                and containing responseCode
                    indicating the value NOT EQUAL to 0
                and not containing certificate
```

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_07_BI
Summary	Check that the AA rejects the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to verify the integrity of the request using hmacKey
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	**X_PICS**

Expected behaviour

with
the AA in 'operational' state
authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
when
the IUT is received the EtsiTs103097Data message
containing EtsiTs102941Data
containing content.authorizationRequest
containing hmacKey (HMAC)
and containing sharedAtRequest
containing keyTag (KEY_TAG)
indicating wrong value
then
and the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message
and the IUT sends to the TS the AuthorizationResponse message
containing authorizationResponse
containing requestHash
indicating the leftmost 16 bits of the SHA256 value
calculated over the **X_HASH_STRUCTURE**
and containing responseCode
indicating the value NOT EQUAL to 0
and not containing certificate

Variants

nn	X_PICS	X_HASH_STRUCTURE
1	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE	EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
2	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=FALSE	EtsiTs102941Data

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_08_BI
Summary	Send a correctly encoded AT request, but the ITS-Station is not enrolled at the EA
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE

Expected behaviour

with
the AA in 'operational' state
authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
when
the IUT is received the AuthorizationRequest message
containing ecSignature
containing Signer
indicating an unknown EC hashedId8 value
then
and the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message
and the IUT sends to the TS the AuthorizationResponse message
containing authorizationResponse
containing responseCode
indicating the value 'unknownits'
and not containing certificate

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_09_BI
Summary	Send an AT request, but the inner signer (valid EC) is not issued by the EA which is known trusted by the AA. The AA trusts only EAs listed on the RCA-CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE
Expected behaviour	

```
with
    the AA in 'operational' state
        authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
            containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
    when
        the IUT is received the AuthorizationRequest message
            containing SharedAtRequest
                containing eaId
                    indicating an unknown value
    then
        and the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message
        and the IUT sends to the TS the AuthorizationResponse message
            containing authorizationResponse
                containing responseCode
                    indicating the value 'its-aa-unknownea'
                and not containing certificate
```

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_10_BI
Summary	Send an AT request, but the generation time of the POP signature of the CSR is in the past
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE
Expected behaviour	

```
with
    the AA in 'operational' state
        authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
            containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
    when
        the IUT is received the AuthorizationRequest message
            containing POP signature
                containing tbsData
                    containing generationTime
                        indicating a value in the past
    then
        and the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message
        and the IUT sends to the TS the AuthorizationResponse message
            containing authorizationResponse
                containing responseCode
                    indicating the value 'its-aa-outofsyncrequest'
                and not containing certificate
```

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_11_BI
Summary	Send an AT request, but the generation time of the POP signature of the CSR is in the future
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE
Expected behaviour	

with
the AA in 'operational' state
authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
when
the IUT is received the AuthorizationRequest message
containing POP signature
containing tbsData
containing generationTime
indicating a value in the past
then
and the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message
and the IUT sends to the TS the AuthorizationResponse message
containing authorizationResponse
containing responseCode
indicating the value 'its-aa-outofsyncrequest'
and not containing certificate

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_12_BI
Summary	Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is before the start date of the EC
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE
Expected behaviour	

with
the AA in 'operational' state
authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
when
the IUT is received the AuthorizationRequest message
containing SharedAtRequest
containing requestedSubjecAttributes
containing ValidityPeriod
indicating a value less than the start date of the EC
then
and the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message
and the IUT sends to the TS the AuthorizationResponse message
containing authorizationResponse
containing responseCode
indicating the value 'deniedpermissions'
and not containing certificate

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_13_BI
Summary	Send an AT request, but the start date of the CSR is before the start date of the EC
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE
Expected behaviour	
with the AA in 'operational' state authorized with the certificate CERT_AA containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY) ensure that when the IUT is received the AuthorizationRequest message containing SharedAtRequest containing requestedSubjecAttributes containing ValidityPeriod containing start date indicating a value less than the start date of the EC then and the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message and the IUT sends to the TS the AuthorizationResponse message containing authorizationResponse containing responseCode indicating the value 'deniedpermissions' and not containing certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_14_BI
Summary	Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is after the expiry date of the EC
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE
Expected behaviour	
with the AA in 'operational' state authorized with the certificate CERT_AA containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY) ensure that when the IUT is received the AuthorizationRequest message containing SharedAtRequest containing requestedSubjecAttributes containing ValidityPeriod indicating a value greater than the ValidityPeriod of the EC then and the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message and the IUT sends to the TS the AuthorizationResponse message containing authorizationResponse containing responseCode indicating the value 'deniedpermissions' and not containing certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_15_BI
Summary	Send an AT request, but the start date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EC
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE
Expected behaviour	

with
the AA in 'operational' state
authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
when
the IUT is received the AuthorizationRequest message
containing SharedAtRequest
containing requestedSubjecAttributes
containing ValidityPeriod
containing start date
indicating a value greater than the start date of the EC
then
and the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message
and the IUT sends to the TS the AuthorizationResponse message
containing authorizationResponse
containing responseCode
indicating the value 'deniedpermissions'
and not containing certificate

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_16_BI
Summary	SSend an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is after now + maximum preloading period (considering values in C-ITS CP)
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE
Expected behaviour	

with
the AA in 'operational' state
authorized with the certificate CERT_AA
containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
ensure that
when
the IUT is received the AuthorizationRequest message
containing SharedAtRequest
containing requestedSubjecAttributes
containing ValidityPeriod
containing start date
indicating the current date
and a duration
indication 100 years
then
and the IUT does not send the AuthorizationValidationRequest message
and the IUT sends to the TS the AuthorizationResponse message
containing authorizationResponse
containing responseCode
indicating the value 'deniedpermissions'
and not containing certificate

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_17_BV
Summary	Check that AA send the same response for the repeated AT request
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1
Configuration	CFG_ENR_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION_RETRY
Expected behaviour	
with the AA is in 'operational' state and the AA already received AuthorizationRequestMessage (***REQ***) having checksum (**CS)** and the AA has sent the AuthorizationResponseMessage (***RES***) containing responseCode indicating OK ensure that when the IUT receives an AuthorizationRequestMessage having checksum indicating value equal to ***CS*** then the IUT answers with an AuthorizationResponseMessage indicating ***RES***	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_18_BV
Summary	Check that AA does not accept authoirization requests when message generation time is too far in the past
Reference	ETSI TS 103 601 [6], clause 5.1.4
Configuration	CFG_ENR_AA
PICS Selection	PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION_RETRY
Expected behaviour	
with the EA is in 'operational' state and the AA already received the AuthorizationRequestMessage (***REQ***) containing generationTime ***TG*** and having checksum (**CS)** ensure that when the IUT receives an AuthorizationRequestMessage at the moment ***TR2*** indicating ***TR2*** > ***TG*** + ***PIXIT_AA_AUTH_TIMEOUT*** and having checksum indicating value equal to ***CS*** then the IUT answers with an AuthorizationResponseMessage containing responseCode indicating `deniedrequest`	
NOTE: PIXIT_AA_AUTH_TIMEOUT shall be set as a TP parameter.	

5.5.2 Authorization validation request

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV
Summary	Check that the AA sends AuthorizationValidationRequest after receiving of the AuthorizationRequest
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the EA in 'operational' state authorized with CERT_EA certificate ensure that when the IUT received the AuthorizationRequest containing EtsiTs102941Data containing content.authorizationRequest containing sharedAtRequest containing eaId (EA_ID) indicating HashedId8 of the CERT_EA then and the IUT sends the EtsiTs103097Data message to the EA identified by EA_ID	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_02_BV
Summary	Check that the AuthorizationValidationRequest message is encrypted using approved algorithm and sent to only one Enrolment Authority
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_ITSS
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the EA in 'operational' state authorized with CERT_EA certificate ensure that when the IUT is triggered to send the AuthorizationValidationRequest to the EA then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data containing content.encryptedData.recipients indicating size 1 and containing the instance of RecipientInfo containing certRecipInfo containing recipientId indicating HashedId8 of the CERT_EA and containing encKey containing eciesNistP256 or containing eciesBrainpoolP256r1	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_03_BV
Summary	Check that the AA sends AuthorizationValidationRequest signed by AA
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the AA in 'operational' state authorized with CERT_AA certificate and the EA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to send the AuthorizationValidationRequest to the EA then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted message containing EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing signedData containing signer containing digest indicating HashedId8 value of the CERT_AA	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_04_BV
Summary	Check that the AA sends signed AuthorizationValidationRequest with signature properly calculated using approved hash algorithm
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the AA in 'operational' state authorized with CERT_AA certificate containing verificationKey (AA_PUB_V_KEY) and the EA in 'operational' state authorized with CERT_EA certificate ensure that when the IUT is triggered to send the AuthorizationValidationRequest to the EA then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted message containing EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing signedData containing hashId indicating supported hash algorytm (HASH_ALG) and containing signature calculated using the HASH_ALG and private key correspondent to the AA_PUB_V_KEY	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_05_BV
Summary	Check that the AA sends signed AuthorizationValidationRequest using proper signed data headers
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the AA in 'operational' state authorized with CERT_AA certificate containing verificationKey (AA_PUB_V_KEY) and the EA in 'operational' state authorized with CERT_EA certificate ensure that when the IUT is triggered to send the AuthorizationValidationRequest to the EA then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted message containing EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing signedData containing tbsData containing headerInfo containing psid indicating AID_PKI_CERT_REQUEST and containing generationTime and not containing any other headers	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_06_BV
Summary	Check that the AA sends AuthorizationValidationRequest version 1
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the EA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to send the AuthorizationValidationRequest to the EA then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted message containing EtsiTs102941Data containing version indicating 1	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_07_BV
Summary	Check that the AA sends AuthorizationValidationRequest with `sharedAtRequest` and `ecSignature` as it was requested in the triggering AuthorizationRequest
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.4.1
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the AA in 'operational' state and the EA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT received the AuthorizationRequest containing EtsiTs102941Data containing content.authorizationRequest containing sharedAtRequest (SHARED_AT_REQUEST) and containing ecSignature (EC_SIGNATURE) then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted message containing EtsiTs102941Data containing content.authorizationValidationRequest containing sharedAtRequest indicating SHARED_AT_REQUEST and containing ecSignature indicating EC_SIGNATURE	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_08_BV
Summary	Check that signing of Authorization Validation request message is permitted by the AA certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the AA in 'operational' state and the EA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to send the AuthorizationValidationRequest to the EA then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted structure containing signer declared as a digest containing the HashedId8 of the AA certificate containing appPermissions containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ and containing ssp containing opaque[0] (version) indicating 1 containing opaque[1] (value) indicating 'Enrolment Request' (bit 1) set to 1	

5.5.3 Authorization validation response handling

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_01_BV
Summary	Check that the AA sends AuthorizationResponse after receiving the AuthorizationRequest
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.2
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the ITSS in 'enrolled' state the EA in 'operational' state and the IUT(AA) in 'operational' state and the IUT had received the AuthorizationRequest from the ITSS and the IUT sent the AuthorizationValidationRequest ensure that when the IUT received the AuthorizationValidationResponseMessage then the IUT sends the EtsiTs103097Data message to the ITSS	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI
Summary	Check that AA does not accept Authorization Validation Response message when this message is signed with certificate without appropriate permissions
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the ITSS in 'enrolled' state the EA in 'operational' state and the IUT(AA) in 'operational' state and the IUT had received the AuthorizationRequest from the ITSS and the IUT sent the AuthorizationValidationRequest ensure that when the IUT receives the AuthorizationValidationResponseMessage containing signer containing digest indicating HashedId8 of the certificate containing appPermissions not containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ or containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ and containing ssp containing opaque[0] (version) indicating other value than 1 or containing opaque[1] (value) indicating 'AuthorizationValidationResponse' (bit 4) set to 0 then the IUT answers with an AuthorizationValidationResponseMessage containing responseCode indicating non-zero value	

5.5.4 Authorization response

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_01_BV
Summary	Check that the AA sends encrypted AuthorizationResponse
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.2
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the ITSS in 'enrolled' state has sent the AuthorizationRequestMessage containing encrypted enkKey containing AES symmetric key (SYM_KEY) the EA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to send the authorization response to the ITSS then the IUT sends the EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted message containing content.encryptedData containing recipients of size 1 containing the instance of RecipientInfo containing `pskRecipInfo` indicating HashedId8 of the SYM_KEY and containing cyphertext encrypted using SYM_KEY	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_02_BV
Summary	Check that the AA sends signed AuthorizationResponse
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.2
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the ITSS in 'enrolled' state and the IUT(AA) in 'operational' state authorized with CERT_AA certificate and the EA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to send the authorization response to the ITSS then the IUT sends the EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted message containing the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing signedData containing signer containing digest indicating HashedId8 value of the CERT_AA	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_03_BV
Summary	Check that the AA sends signed AuthorizationResponse with signature properly calculated using approved hash algorithm
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.2
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the ITSS in 'enrolled' state and the IUT(AA) in 'operational' state authorized with CERT_AA certificate containing verificationKey (AA_PUB_V_KEY) and the EA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to send the authorization response to the ITSS then and the IUT sends the EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted message containing the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing signedData containing hashId indicating supported hash algorytm (HASH_ALG) and containing signature calculated using the HASH_ALG and private key correspondent to the AA_PUB_V_KEY	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_04_BV
Summary	Check that the AA sends signed AuthorizationResponse with signature properly calculated using approved hash algorithm
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.2
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the ITSS in 'enrolled' state and the IUT(AA) in 'operational' state and the EA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is triggered to send the authorization response to the ITSS then the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted message containing EtsiTs103097Data-Signed containing signedData containing tbsData containing headerInfo containing psid indicating AID_PKI_CERT_REQUEST and containing generationTime and not containing any other headers	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_05_BV
Summary	Check that the AA sends signed AuthorizationResponse with signature properly calculated using approved hash algorithm
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.2
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	**X_PICS**

Expected behaviour

with
the ITSS in 'enrolled' state
has sent the AuthorizationRequestMessage
containing EtsiTs102941Data
containing authorizationResponse
containing **X_DATA_STRUCTURE**
and the IUT(AA) in 'operational' state
and the EA in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the IUT is triggered to send the authorization response to the ITSS
then
the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted message
containing EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
containing EtsiTs102941Data
containing authorizationResponse
containing requestHash
indicating the leftmost 16 bits of the SHA256 value
calculated over the **X_DATA_STRUCTURE**
and containing responseCode

Variants

nn	**X_PICS**	**X_DATA_STRUCTURE**
1	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=TRUE	EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
2	PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP=FALSE	EtsiTs102941Data

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_06_BV
Summary	Check that the AA includes the certificate in the positive AuthorizationResponse
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.2
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	

Expected behaviour

with
the ITSS in 'enrolled' state
has sent the AuthorizationRequestMessage
and the IUT(AA) in 'operational' state
and the EA in 'operational' state
ensure that
when
the IUT is sending to the ITSS the AuthorizationResponseMessage (MSG)
containing responseCode
indicating 0
then
the message MSG
containing certificate

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_07_BV
Summary	Check that the AA does not include the certificate in the negative AuthorizationResponse
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.2
Configuration	CFG_AUTH_AA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the ITSS in 'enrolled' state has sent the AuthorizationRequestMessage and the IUT(AA) in 'operational' state and the EA in 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is sending to the ITSS the AuthorizationResponseMessage (MSG) containing responseCode indicating negative value then the message MSG not containing certificate	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_08_BV
Summary	Check that signing of Authorization response message is permitted by the AA certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT sends an AuthorizationResponseMessage as an answer for an AuthorizationRequestMessage then the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted structure containing signer declared as a digest containing the HashedId8 of the AA certificate containing appPermissions containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ and containing ssp containing opaque[0] (version) indicating 1 containing opaque[1] (value) indicating 'Authorization Response' (bit 3) set to 1	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_AUTH_09_BV
Summary	Check that generated AT certificate contains only allowed permissions
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_ENR_EA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT is requested to send an AuthorizationResponseMessage containing a certificate (AT_CERT) then the EC_CERT containing appPermissions NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ or containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ and containing ssp containing opaque[0] (version) indicating 1 containing opaque[1] (value) indicating 00h and NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CTL and NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CRL	

5.5.5 CA Certificate Request

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_CERTGEN_01_BV
Summary	SubCA certificate requests of the AA are transported to the RCA using CACertificateRequest messages across the reference point S9
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage then the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage across the reference point S9 to the RCA	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_CERTGEN_02_BV
Summary	The application form should include the digital fingerprint of the CACertificateRequestMessage in printable format. The digital fingerprint of the CACertificateRequestMessage is computed using a ETSI TS 103 097 [2] approved hash algorithm
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1 ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 7
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
the IUT being in the 'initial' state
ensure that
when
the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage
then
the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage
containing a signature (SIG)
being computed using a ETSI TS 103 097 [2] approved hash algorithm
and the IUT exports the digital fingerprint (SIG) in a printable format.

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_CERTGEN_03_BV
Summary	The hashId shall indicate the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2], the signer is set to 'self' and the signature over the tbsData is computed using the private key corresponding to the new verificationKey to be certified (i.e. the request is self-signed)
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1 ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 7
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
the IUT being in the 'initial' state
ensure that
when
the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage
then
the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage
being an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure
containing hashId
indicating the hash algorithm to be used
and containing signer
indicating 'self'
and containing tbsData
containing CaCertificateRequest
containing publicKeys
containing verification_key (VKEY)
and containing signature
computed over tbsData using the private key corresponding to the verificationKey (VKEY)

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_CERTGEN_04_BV
Summary	An ECC private key is randomly generated, the corresponding public key (verificationKey) is provided to be included in the CaCertificateRequest. An ECC encryption private key is randomly generated, the corresponding public key (encryptionKey) is provided to be included in the CACertificateRequest. CaCertificateRequest.publicKeys shall contain verification_key and encryption_key
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initial' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage then the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage containing CaCertificateRequest containing publicKeys containing verification_key and containing encryption_key	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_CERTGEN_05_BV
Summary	The EtsiTs102941Data structure is built with version set to v1 (integer value set to 1).
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initial' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage then the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage containing EtsiTs102941Data containing version indicating v1 (integer value set to 1)	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_CERTGEN_06_BV
Summary	CaCertificateRequest.requestedSubjectAttributes shall contain the requested certificates attributes as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2] clause 7.2.4
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1 ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 7.2.4
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initial' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage then the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage containing CaCertificateRequest containing requestedSubjectAttributes as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 7.2.4.	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_CERTGEN_07_BV
Summary	EtsiTs103097Data-Signed.tbsData contains the EtsiTs102941Data as payload and the headerInfo containing psid and generationTime. The psid shall be set to "secured certificate request" as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 [i.2] and the generationTime shall be present. All other components of the component tbsdata.headerInfo are not used and absent
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_INIT
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'initial' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRequestMessage then the IUT sends a CACertificateRequestMessage containing headerInfo containing psid indicating SEC_CERT_REQ and containing generationTime and not containing any other component of tbsdata.headerInfo	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_CERTGEN_08_BV
Summary	If the current private key has reached its end of validity period or is revoked, the SubCA shall restart the initial certificate application process
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_REKEY
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRekeyingMessage and SubCA certificate is no longer valid (due to end of validity or revocation) then the IUT switches to the ''initial' state and sends a CACertificateRequestMessage	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_CERTGEN_09_BV
Summary	For the re-keying application to the RCA (CaCertificateRekeyingMessage), an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure is built, containing: hashId, tbsData, signer and signature. The hashId shall indicate the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [2]. The signer declared as a digest, containing the hashedId8 AA certificate and the signature over tbsData is computed using the currently valid private key corresponding to the AA certificate (outer signature)
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1 ETSI TS 103 097 [2], clause 7
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_REKEY
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRekeyingMessage then the sends a CACertificateRekeyingMessage being an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure containing hashId indicating the hash algorithm to be used and containing tbsData and containing signer declared as digest indicating the hashedId8 of the SubCA certificate (CERT) and containing signature computed over tbsData using the private key corresponding to CERT	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_CERTGEN_10_BV
Summary	The (outer) tbsData of the CACertificateRekeyingMessage shall contain the CaCertificateRequestMessage as payload
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_REKEY
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRekeyingMessage then the sends a CACertificateRekeyingMessage containing tbsData containing CaCertificateRequestMessage	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_CERTGEN_11_BV
Summary	The (outer) tbsData of the CACertificateRekeyingMessage shall contain a headerInfo containing psid and generationTime. The psid shall be set to "secured certificate request" as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 [i.2] and the generationTime shall be present. All other components of the component tbsdata.headerInfo are not used and absent
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_REKEY
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRekeyingMessage then the sends a CACertificateRekeyingMessage containing tbsData containing headerInfo containing psid indicating SEC_CERT_REQ and containing generationTime and not containing any other component of tbsdata.headerInfo	

TP Id	SECPKI_AA_CERTGEN_12_BV
Summary	Check that the CaCertificateRekeyingMessage is permitted by AA certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.1
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_REKEY
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the IUT being in the 'operational' state ensure that when the IUT is requested to send a CACertificateRekeyingMessage then the sends a CACertificateRekeyingMessage being an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure and containing tbsData and containing signer containing digest indicating HashedId8 of the AA certificate containing appPermissions containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CERT_REQ and containing ssp containing opaque[0] (version) indicating 1 containing opaque[1] (value) indicating 'CA Certificate Response' (bit 6) set to 1	

5.6 RootCA behaviour

5.6.0 Overview

All test purposes in the present clause may be included in the test sequence if the following PICS items is set:

PICS_SECPKI_IUT_RCA = TRUE

5.6.1 CTL generation

For the scope of test purposes of this clause, the `EtsiTs103097Data` and `EtsiTs102941Data` envelopes are already removed from the analysing messages if it is not explicitly specified in the test purpose.

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_01_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when new EA is about to be added to the Root CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.3.2 and 6.3.4
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the RootCA is triggered to add new EA certificate (CERT_EA) in the CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing isFullCtl indicating TRUE and containing ctlCommands containing CtlCommand containing add containing ea containing eaCertificate indicating CERT_EA	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_02_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Delta CTL when new EA is about to be added to the Root CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.3.2 and 6.3.4
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the RootCA is triggered to add new EA certificate (CERT_EA) in the CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing isFullCtl indicating FALSE and containing ctlCommands containing CtlCommand containing add containing ea containing eaCertificate indicating CERT_EA	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_03_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when EA certificate is about to be deleted
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.3.2 and 6.3.4
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to delete EA certificate (CERT_EA) from the CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
      containing isFullCtl
        indicating TRUE
      and containing ctlCommands
        not containing CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing ea
              containing eaCertificate
                indicating CERT_EA

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_04_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Delta CTL when EA certificate is about to be deleted
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.3.2 and 6.3.4
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to delete EA certificate (CERT_EA) from the CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
      containing isFullCtl
        indicating FALSE
      and containing ctlCommands
        not containing CtlCommand
          containing delete
            containing cert
              indicating Hashedid8 of CERT_EA

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_05_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when EA access point is about to be changed
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to add new EA access point URL (URL) to the CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
      containing isFullCtl
        indicating TRUE
      containing ctlCommands
        containing CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing ea
              containing eaCertificate (CERT_EA)
              and containing itsAccessPoint
                indicating URL
        and NOT containing any other CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing ea
              containing eaCertificate
                indicating CERT_EA

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_06_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Delta CTL when EA access point is about to be changed
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.3.2 and 6.3.4
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to add new EA access point URL (URL) to the CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
      containing isFullCtl
        indicating FALSE
      containing ctlCommands
        containing CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing ea
              containing eaCertificate (CERT_EA)
              and containing itsAccessPoint
                indicating URL

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_07_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when EA access point URL for AA communication is about to be changed
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to add new URL for EA-AA communication (URL) to the CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
      containing isFullCtl
        indicating TRUE
      containing ctlCommands
        containing CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing ea
              containing eaCertificate (CERT_EA)
              containing aaAccessPoint
                indicating URL
        and NOT containing any other CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing ea
              containing eaCertificate
                indicating CERT_EA

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_08_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Delta CTL when EA access point URL for AA communication is about to be changed
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to add new URL for EA-AA communication (URL) to the CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
      containing isFullCtl
        indicating FALSE
      containing ctlCommands
        containing CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing ea
              containing eaCertificate (CERT_EA)
              containing aaAccessPoint
                indicating URL

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_09_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when new AA is about to be added to the Root CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to add new AA certificate (CERT_AA) in the CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
      containing isFullCtl
        indicating TRUE
      and containing ctlCommands
        containing CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing aa
              containing aaCertificate
                indicating CERT_AA

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_10_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Delta CTL when new AA is about to be added to the Root CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.3.2 and 6.3.4
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to add new AA certificate (CERT_AA) in the CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
      containing isFullCtl
        indicating FALSE
      and containing ctlCommands
        containing CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing aa
              containing aaCertificate
                indicating CERT_AA

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_11_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when AA is about to be deleted from the Root CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to delete AA certificate (CERT_AA) from the CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
      containing isFullCtl
        indicating TRUE
      and containing ctlCommands
        not containing CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing aa
              containing aaCertificate
                indicating CERT_AA

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_12_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Delta CTL when AA is about to be deleted from the Root CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.3.2 and 6.3.4
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to delete AA certificate (CERT_AA) from the CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
      containing isFullCtl
        indicating FALSE
      and containing ctlCommands
        not containing CtlCommand
          containing delete
            containing cert
              indicating HashedId8 of CERT_AA

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_13_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when AA access point URL is about to be changes
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to add new URL for AA access point (URL) to the CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
      containing isFullCtl
        indicating TRUE
      containing ctlCommands
        containing CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing aa
              containing aaCertificate
              containing accessPoint
                indicating URL
        and NOT containing any other CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing aa
              containing aaCertificate
                indicating CERT_AA

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_14_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the Delta CTL when AA access point URL is about to be changes
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to add new URL for AA access point (URL) to the CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
      containing isFullCtl
        indicating TRUE
      containing ctlCommands
        containing CtlCommand
          containing add
            containing aa
              containing aaCertificate
              containing accessPoint
                indicating URL

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_15_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA CTL is signed using RootCA verification key Check that signing of the RootCA CTL is permitted by the RootCA certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
  the TLM already issued the TLM CTL list
    containing RootCA certificate (CERT_RCA)
ensure that
  when
    the RootCA is triggered to issue a new CTL
  then
    the IUT issue a new CTL of type RcaCertificateTrustListMessage
      containing signedData
        containing signer.digest
          indicating HashedID8 of the RootCA certificate (CERT_RCA)
            containing appPermissions
              containing an item of type PsidSsp
                containing psid
                  indicating AID_CTL
                and containing ssp
                  containing opaque[0] (version)
                    indicating 1
                  containing opaque[1] (value)
                    indicating 'TLM entries' (bit 0) set to 0
                    indicating 'RCA entries' (bit 1) set to 0
                    indicating 'EA entries' (bit 2) set to 1
                    indicating 'AA entries' (bit 3) set to 1
                    indicating 'DC entries' (bit 4) set to 1

NOTE: The EtsiTs103097Data and EtsiTs102941Data envelopes are not yet removed from the analysing message.

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_16_BV
Summary	Check that the RCA CTL sequence counter is monotonically increased
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the RCA already has issued the previous CTL of type CtlFormat containing ctlSequence indicating N ensure that when the RCA is triggered to issue a new CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing ctlSequence indicating N+1	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_17_BV
Summary	Check that the RCA CTL sequence counter is rounded on the value of 256
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the RCA already has issued the previous CTL of type CtlFormat containing ctlSequence indicating 255 ensure that when the RCA is triggered to issue a new CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing ctlSequence indicating 0	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_18_BV
Summary	Check that the RCA CTL has an end-validity time
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the RCA is triggered to issue a new CTL at time T1 then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing nextUpdate indicating timestamp greater then T1	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_19_BV
Summary	Check that the RCA CTL does not contain not allowed entities
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the RCA is triggered to issue a new CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing ctlCommands not containing any item of type CtlCommand containing add containing tlm or containing rca	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_20_BV
Summary	Check that the RCA Delta CTL is generated at the same time as FullCTL. Check that the RCA Delta CTL is a difference between correspondent Full CTL and the previous Full CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the RCA already issued the previous CTL of type CtlFormat (CTL_FULL_PREV) containing isFullCtl indicating TRUE containing ctlSequence indicating N ensure that when the RCA is triggered to issue a new CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat (CTL_FULL) containing isFullCtl indicating TRUE and containing ctlSequence indicating N+1 and the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat (CTL_DELTA) containing isFullCtl indicating FALSE and containing ctlSequence indicating N+1 containing ctlCommands indicating difference between CTL_FULL and CTL_FULL_PREV	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_21_BV
Summary	Check that the RCA CTL version is set to 1
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT is triggered to issue a new CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing version indicating 1	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_22_BV
Summary	Check that the RCA Full CTL does not contain commands of type 'delete'
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT is triggered to delete the CA from the CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat (CTL_FULL) containing isFullCtl indicating TRUE and containing ctlCommands NOT containing any item of type CtlCommand containing delete	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CTLGEN_23_BV
Summary	Check that the RCA CTL contains at least one DC entry
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.2
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT is triggered to issue a new CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing isFullCtl indicating TRUE and containing ctlCommands containing at least one ctlCommand containing add containing url indicating URL of the DC of the IUT containing cert containing the item of type HashedId8 indicating the HashedId8 of the IUT certificate	

5.6.2 CRL generation

For the scope of test purposes of this clause, the `EtsiTs103097Data` and `EtsiTs102941Data` envelopes are already removed from the analysing messages if it is not explicitly specified in the test purpose.

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CRLGEN_01_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the CRL signed with appropriate certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.3
Configuration	CFG_CRLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the RootCA is triggered to generate new CRL then the IUT generates the CertificateRevocationListMessage containing signer containing digest indicating HashedId8 of RootCA certificate containing appPermissions containing an item of type PsidSsp containing psid indicating AID_CRL and containing ssp containing opaque[0] (version) indicating 1	
NOTE: The EtsiTs103097Data and EtsiTs102941Data envelopes are not yet removed from the analysing message.	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CRLGEN_02_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the CRL when CA certificate is about to be revoked
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.3
Configuration	CFG_CRLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the RootCA is triggered to add new CA certificate (CERT_CA) to the revocation list then the IUT issue a new CRL of type ToBeSignedCrl and containing entries containing item of type CrlEntry indicating HashID8 of the CERT_CA	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CRLGEN_03_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the CRL when its own certificate is about to be revoked
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.3
Configuration	CFG_CRLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the TLM already issued the CTL containing the RCA certificate CERT_RCA ensure that when the RootCA is triggered to revoke itself then the IUT issue a new CRL of type ToBeSignedCrl containing entries containing item of type CrlEntry indicating HashID8 of the CERT_RCA	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CRLGEN_04_BV
Summary	Check that the CRL of the RCA is timestamped
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.3
Configuration	CFG_CRLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the RootCA is triggered to issue a new CRL at the time T1 then the IUT issue a new CRL of type ToBeSignedCrl containing thisUpdate indicating timestamp greater or equal to the T1	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CRLGEN_05_BV
Summary	Check that the RCA issuing a new CRL when previous one is expired
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.3
Configuration	CFG_CRLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the RCA already issued the CRL containing nextUpdate indicating time Tprev ensure that when the Tprev is less than current time (Tcur) then the IUT issue a new CRL of type ToBeSignedCrl containing thisUpdate indicating timestamp greater or equal to the Tcur and containing nextUpdate indicating timestamp greater than Tcur and greater than thisUpdate	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CRLGEN_06_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA is generated the CRL when its own certificate is about to be revoked
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.3
Configuration	CFG_CRLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the RootCA is triggered to issue a new CRL then the IUT issue a new CRL of type ToBeSignedCrl and containing entries does not containing item of type CrlEntry indicating HashID8 of other RootCA	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CRLGEN_07_BV
Summary	Check that the RootCA generates the CRL when CA certificate is about to be revoked
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.3
Configuration	CFG_CRLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the RootCA is triggered to issue a new CRL then the IUT issue a new CRL of type ToBeSignedCrl and containing entries does not containing item of type CrlEntry indicating HashID8 of other RootCA	

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CRLGEN_08_BV
Summary	Check that the RCA CRL version is set to 1
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.3
Configuration	CFG_CRLGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the RCA is triggered to issue a new CRL then the IUT issue a new CRL of type ToBeSignedCrl containing version indicating 1	

5.6.3 CA certificate generation

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CAGEN_01_BV
Summary	Check that generated EA certificate contains only allowed permissions
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	

Expected behaviour

ensure that
- when
  - the IUT is requested to generate EA certificate
- then
  - the IUT generate the certificate
    - containing appPermissions
      - containing an item of type PsidSsp
        - containing psid
          - indicating AID_CERT_REQ
        - and containing ssp
          - containing opaque[0] (version)
            - indicating 1
          - containing opaque[1] (value)
            - indicating 'Authorization validation Response' (bit 4) set to 1
            - and indicating 'Enrolment Response' (bit 5) set to 1
            - and indicating 'CA certificate request' (bit 6) set to 1
            - and indicating other bits set to 0
      - and NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp
        - containing psid
          - indicating AID_CTL
      - and NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp
        - containing psid
          - indicating AID_CRL
    - containing certIssuePermissions
      - containing an item of type PsidGroupPermissions
        - containing eeType
          - indicating app
        - containing subjectPermissions
          - containing explicit
            - containing en item of type PsidSspRange
              - containing psid
                - indicating AID_CERT_REQ
              - and containing sspRange
                - containing bitmapSspRange
                - containing sspBitmask
                - indicating FFh
                - containing sspValue
                - indicating 01h A0h
            - and NOT containing an item of type PsidSspRange
              - containing psid
                - indicating AID_CTL
            - and NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp
              - containing psid
                - indicating AID_CRL

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CAGEN_02_BV
Summary	Check that generated AA certificate contains only allowed permissions
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	

Expected behaviour

ensure that
- when
  - the IUT is requested to generate AA certificate
- then
  - the IUT generate the certificate
    - containing appPermissions
      - containing an item of type PsidSsp
        - containing psid
          - indicating AID_CERT_REQ
        - and containing ssp
          - containing opaque[0] (version)
            - indicating 1
          - containing opaque[1] (value)
            - indicating 'Authorization validation Request (bit 2) set to 1
            - and indicating 'Authorization Response' (bit 3) set to 1
            - and indicating 'CA certificate request' (bit 6) set to 1
            - and indicating other bits set to 0
      - and NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp
        - containing psid
          - indicating AID_CTL
      - and NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp
        - containing psid
          - indicating AID_CRL
    - containing certIssuePermissions
      - containing an item of type PsidGroupPermissions
        - containing eeType
          - indicating app
        - containing subjectPermissions
          - containing explicit
            - NOT containing en item of type PsidSspRange
              - containing psid
                - indicating AID_CERT_REQ
            - or containing en item of type PsidSspRange
              - containing psid
                - indicating AID_CERT_REQ
              - and containing sspRange
                - containing bitmapSspRange
                  - containing sspBitmask
                    - indicating FFh
                  - containing sspValue
                    - indicating 01h 00h
            - and NOT containing an item of type PsidSspRange
              - containing psid
                - indicating AID_CTL
            - and NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp
              - containing psid
                - indicating AID_CRL

TP Id	SECPKI_RCA_CAGEN_03_BV
Summary	Check that generated RootCA certificate contains only allowed permissions
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause B.5
Configuration	CFG_CAGEN_RCA
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
- when
  - the IUT is requested to generate AA certificate
- then
  - the IUT generate the certificate
    - containing appPermissions
      - NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp
        - containing psid
          - indicating AID_CERT_REQ
      - and containing an item of type PsidSsp
        - containing psid
          - indicating AID_CTL
        - and containing ssp of length 2
          - indicating 01h 38h
      - and containing an item of type PsidSsp
        - containing psid
          - indicating AID_CRL
        - and containing ssp of length 1
          - containing opaque[0] (version)
            - indicating 1
    - and containing certIssuePermissions
      - containing an item of type PsidGroupPermissions
        - containing eeType
          - indicating app
        - containing subjectPermissions
          - containing explicit
            - containing en item of type PsidSspRange
              - containing psid
                - indicating AID_CERT_REQ
              - and containing sspRange
                - containing bitmapSspRange
                  - containing sspBitmask of length 2
                    - indicating FFh FFh
                  - containing sspValue of length 2
                    - indicating 01h FEh
            - and NOT containing an item of type PsidSspRange
              - containing psid
                - indicating AID_CTL
            - and NOT containing an item of type PsidSsp
              - containing psid
                - indicating AID_CRL

5.7 DC behaviour

TP Id	SECPKI_DC_LISTDIST_01_BV
Summary	Check that the RCA CRL is published and accessible when issued
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.3
Configuration	CFG_DC
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
- the TLM issued a new CRL

ensure that
- when
  - the ITS-S asked the IUT for the newly issued CRL
- then
  - the IUT is answered with this CRL

TP Id	SECPKI_DC_LISTDIST_02_BV
Summary	Check that the RCA CTL is published and accessible when issued
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.3.2 and 6.3.3
Configuration	CFG_DC
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the TLM issued a new CTL ensure that when the ITS-S asked the IUT for the newly issued CTL then the IUT is answered with this CTL	

5.8 TLM behaviour

5.8.1 CTL generation

For the scope of test purposes of this clause, the `EtsiTs103097Data` and `EtsiTs102941Data` envelopes are already removed from the analysing messages if it is not explicitly specified in the test purpose.

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_01_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM generates the ECTL when new RootCA is about to be added
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the TLM is triggered to add new RootCA certificate (CERT_RCA) in the CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing isFullCtl indicating TRUE and containing ctlCommands containing CtlCommand containing add containing rca containing selfsignedRootCa indicating CERT_RCA	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_02_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM generates the Delta ECTL when new RootCA is about to be added
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the TLM is triggered to add new RootCA certificate (CERT_RCA) in the CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing isFullCtl indicating FALSE and containing ctlCommands containing CtlCommand containing add containing rca containing selfsignedRootCa indicating CERT_RCA	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_03_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM generates the Full ECTL when RootCA is about to be deleted
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the TLM is triggered to delete RootCA certificate (CERT_RCA) from the CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing isFullCtl indicating TRUE and containing ctlCommands not containing CtlCommand containing add containing rca containing selfsignedRootCa indicating CERT_RCA	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_04_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM generates the Delta ECTL when RootCA is about to be deleted
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the TLM is triggered to delete RootCA certificate (CERT_RCA) from the CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing isFullCtl indicating FALSE and containing ctlCommands containing CtlCommand containing delete containing cert indicating HashedId8 of CERT_RCA	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_05_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM generates the ECTL when TLM certificate shall be changed
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the TLM is triggered to add new the TLM certificate (CERT_TLM) in the CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing isFullCtl indicating TRUE and containing ctlCommands not containing CtlCommand containing add containing tlm containing selfSignedTLMCertificate indicating CERT_TLM	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_06_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM generates the Delta ECTL when TLM certificate shall be changed
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the TLM is triggered to add new the TLM certificate (CERT_TLM) in the CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing isFullCtl indicating FALSE and containing ctlCommands not containing CtlCommand containing add containing tlm containing selfSignedTLMCertificate indicating CERT_TLM	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_07_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM generates the ECTL when CPOC access point has been changed
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.3.1 and 6.3.4
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the TLM is triggered to change the CPOC URL in the CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing isFullCtl indicating TRUE and containing ctlCommands not containing CtlCommand containing add containing tlm containing accessPoint indicating URL	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_08_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM generates the ECTL when CPOC access point has been changed
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.3.1 and 6.3.4
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the TLM is triggered to change the CPOC URL in the CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing isFullCtl indicating FALSE and containing ctlCommands not containing CtlCommand containing add containing tlm containing accessPoint indicating URL	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_09_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM CTL is signed using TLM verification key Check that signing of TLM CTL is allowed by the TLM certificate
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

ensure that
- when
  - the TLM is triggered to issue a new CTL
- then
  - the IUT issue a new CTL of type TlmCertificateTrustListMessage
    - containing signedData
      - containing signer.digest
        - indicating HashedID8 of the TLM certificate (TLM_CERT)
          - containing appPermissions
            - containing an item of type PsidSsp
              - containing psid
                - indicating AID_CTL
              - and containing ssp
                - containing opaque[0] (version)
                - indicating 1
                - containing opaque[1] (value)
                - indicating 'TLM entries' (bit 0) set to 1
                - indicating 'RCA entries' (bit 1) set to 1
                - indicating 'EA entries' (bit 2) set to 0
                - indicating 'AA entries' (bit 3) set to 0
                - indicating 'DC entries' (bit 4) set to 1
      - containing tbsData.payload.data
        - containing OER-encoded EtsiTs103097Data structure
          - containing OER-encoder EtsiTs102941Data structure
            - containing content.certificateTrustListTlm
              - containing ctlCommands
                - containing add
                - containing tlm
                - containing selfSignedTLMCertificate
                - indicating TLM_CERT

NOTE: The EtsiTs103097Data and EtsiTs102941Data envelopes are not yet removed from the analysing message.

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_10_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM CTL sequence counter is monotonically increased
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	

with
- the TLM already has issued the previous CTL of type CtlFormat
  - containing ctlSequence
    - indicating N

ensure that
- when
  - the TLM is triggered to issue a new CTL
- then
  - the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat
    - containing ctlSequence
      - indicating N+1

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_11_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM CTL sequence counter is rounded on the value of 256
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the TLM already has issued the previous CTL of type CtlFormat containing ctlSequence indicating 255 ensure that when the TLM is triggered to issue a new CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing ctlSequence indicating 0	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_12_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM CTL has an end-validity time
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the TLM is triggered to issue a new CTL at time **T1** then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing nextUpdate indicating timestamp greater then **T1**	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_13_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM CTL does not have other entries then allowed
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the TLM is triggered to issue a new CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing ctlCommands not containing any item of type CtlCommand containing add containing ea or containing aa	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_14_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM Delta CTL is generated at the same time as FullCTL. Check that the TLM Delta CTL is a difference between correspondent Full CTL and the previous Full CTL
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the TLM already issued the previous CTL of type CtlFormat (CTL_FULL_PREV) containing isFullCtl indicating TRUE containing ctlSequence indicating N ensure that when the TLM is triggered to issue a new CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat (CTL_FULL) containing isFullCtl indicating TRUE and containing ctlSequence indicating N+1 and the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat (CTL_DELTA) containing isFullCtl indicating FALSE and containing ctlSequence indicating N+1 containing ctlCommands indicating difference between CTL_FULL and CTL_FULL_PREV	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_15_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM CTL version is set to 1
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.4
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT is triggered to issue a new CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing version indicating 1	

TP Id	SECPKI_TLM_ECTLGEN_16_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM Full CTL does not contain commands of type 'delete'
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.3.1
Configuration	CFG_CTLGEN_TLM
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
ensure that when the IUT is triggered to delete the CA from the CTL then the IUT issue a new CTL of type CtlFormat containing isFullCtl indicating TRUE and containing ctlCommands NOT containing any item of type CtlCommand containing delete	

5.9 CPOC behaviour

TP Id	SECPKI_CPOC_LISTDIST_01_BV
Summary	Check that the TLM CTL is published and accessible when issued
Reference	ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clauses 6.3.2 and 6.3.3
Configuration	CFG_CPOC
PICS Selection	
Expected behaviour	
with the TLM issued a new CTL ensure that when the ITS-S asked the IUT for the newly issued CTL then the IUT is answered with this CTL	

History

Document history		
V1.1.1	March 2019	Publication
V1.2.1	January 2022	Publication